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This thesis explores the role of think tank research in Members of Congress’s public 
facing communication. I theorize that legislators’ policy preferences already exist and shape the 
think tank research they choose to discuss instead of think tank research shaping these policy 
preferences. Many scholars seek to understand the influence of think tanks on policy, but, in 
doing so, have overlooked the rhetorical use of think tank information by Members of Congress. 
By addressing these channels of communication through analyzing public facing communicative 
platforms including Twitter, Facebook, and Floor Speeches, I hope to contribute to think tank 
research in understanding how these institutions shape, or do not shape, Members of Congress’s 
policy preferences in policy-making.  
Using a mixed methodological approach, I find that think tanks are a recurring and 
prominent feature of Members of Congress’s public facing communications and that legislators 
not only cite think tanks with ideology that aligns with their own, but also cite think tanks with 
opposite ideological makeup. These findings are consistent with my theoretical argument that 
Members of Congress tend to cite think tanks to reaffirm existing policy preferences; whether 
that be through positive or negative rhetoric in their citations of think tanks. These results have 
important implications for the ways that think tanks are understood in the policy-making process 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 On April 26, 2018, Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) went on the floor of the United 
States Senate to give a speech alongside a large cutout board that read “The Heritage 
Foundation.” In his speech, Senator Merkley refers to the Heritage Foundation as a think tank 
that engages “in a mission of formulating and promoting rightwing public policies” (Merkley 
2018) denies climate change due to the immense amount of corporate money that the 
organization receives. Additionally, Senator Merkley argues that the Heritage Foundation is 
“there to do the Koch brothers’ bidding” and their purpose “is to sow doubt, [and] mislead 
Americans” (Merkley 2018). Senator Merkley’s speech is one of hundreds given by 
Members of Congress mentioning think tanks alongside policy positions, either rejecting or 
reaffirming the think tank and its positions.  
Think tanks have increasingly risen as prominent institutions that are producing 
research and reports meant to assist Members of Congress in their policy-making. In the past 
few decades, the number of think tanks within the United States has soared and surpassed 
any other country in the number of think tanks existent. Typologies of think tanks have 
become even more pronounced through this growth, with advocacy think tanks proliferating. 
Advocacy think tanks are essentially think tanks that have ideological biases that 
subsequently shape the type of research and funding of the think tank (McGann 2005; 
Medvetz 2012).  As these institutions become more prominent, especially alongside 
increasing asymmetrical polarization in Congress (M. A. Smith 2011), it is integral to 
understand the role they play in the complicated and messy political system within the United 
States.  
 2 
Think tanks, have been studies as contributors in the policy-making process within 
political science literature. Scholars have sought to measure the influence that think tanks 
have on policy but have yet to come to a consensus on the degree to which think tank 
research actually impacts the construction of policy. However, due to literature emphasizing 
the degree of influence that think tanks have had, gaps in research have developed. In 
particular, scholars have generally overlooked the ways that Members of Congress interact 
with and choose think tank research before policy is created. There has been little 
information on the ways that think tank information influences legislators informational 
processing of research and how these processes may shape theoretical conceptions of the role 
of think tanks in policy-making at large. Additionally, as social platforms advance and 
become more widely used by both Members of Congress and think tanks, the channels of 
communication and networks that connects these entities need to be examined in relation to 
how public facing communications are impacting the dissemination and collection of 
advocacy think tank research (Lerner 2018). Thus, while the existing literature on think tanks 
helps assist in the understanding of these institutions and the connections they have with 
Members of Congress, there are still puzzles that need to be addressed. In particular, 
additional research needs to confront question and analyze the degree and extent to which 
think tank research is used within legislators’ information organizing and public facing 
communications; all of which inevitably shapes policy-making processes at large. 
 This thesis examines the following question: How and to what extent is think tank 
research used in Members of Congress’s public facing communications? In this analysis, I 
poise an alternative theoretical model seeking to understand the role, or lack thereof, of think 
tanks in shaping legislators’ policy preference. After considering the plethora of research that 
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currently exists on think tanks and their role in policy-making, I propose and test two sets of 
two unique hypotheses meant to confront the research question and theoretical model of this 
thesis at large. This first set of hypotheses seeks to understand the role that think tanks have 
in Members of Congress’s public facing communications which state: 
 H1A: Think tanks are a prominent and recurring feature of legislators’ public statements and 
presence.  
 
H1B: Members of Congress also reference think tank information from think tanks with 
opposing ideology within their public facing communications 
 
 I employ a quantitative methods approach to test H1A and H1B involving the collection of 
data on the number of citations of think tanks by Members of Congress in their public facing 
communications. In order to understand the extent to which legislators engage with think 
tank research one must understand the degree to which they are cited and the ideological 
makeup of the parties citing ideological think tanks. 
 The second set of hypotheses build off the results in the first set by employing a 
content analysis methodological approach. The second set of hypotheses state that: 
H2A: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that ideologically align with their party to support their policy positions through citations of 
studies or statistics. 
 
H2B: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that do not ideologically align with their party to either support their policy position more by 
mentioning that even think tanks on the other end of the aisle agree with certain policy 
positions or to discredit the credibility of the think tank.  
 
After collecting and analyzing quantitative data as to the regularity and partisan makeup of 
the citations of think tanks by Members of Congress, evidence gathered for H2A and H2B 
further examines the qualitive mentions of think tanks through sampling a proportion of the 
total mentions of advocacy think tanks by Members of Congress in their public facing 
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communications. By doing so, the research question of this thesis can be dynamically 
analyzed through various methodology approaches and hypotheses. 
 The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I synthesize and examine the 
scholarly literature that has guided the foundation of this thesis. In reviewing the literature, 
the gaps in literature and development of the theoretical argument of this thesis is poised. 
Then, in Chapter 3 the mixed methodological approaches used to test the four hypotheses of 
this thesis are put forth. Chapter 4 contains the data collected using the quantitative 
methodological approach detailed in Chapter 3 by testing H1A and H1B and providing 
preliminary conclusions on the findings. Chapter 5 contains the content analysis results with 
a combination of systematic data collected through this method as well as qualitative data 
from Members of Congress’s public facing communications used to confront H2A and H2B. 
The thesis ends with a concluding chapter that synthesizes the findings of the thesis and 
evaluates the evidence in relation to the research question, theoretical framework put forth, 
and hypotheses. The concluding chapter also contains a critical evaluation of limitations 
within the thesis and suggestions on future research on the topic. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 There are more think tanks in the United States than any other country in the world 
(McGann 2016). These institutions, as actors in the ongoing political battle for influence in 
policy-making, have been examined within scholarly literature in the attempt to understand 
their role in the legislative process and the degree of their influence in the outcome of policy 
at large. However, there has been a lack of research regarding the processes of informational 
organizing by Members of Congress and how legislators interact with think tanks as a 
component of policy-making. As a result, this thesis asks the following research question: 
How and to what extent is think tank research used in Members of Congress’s public facing 
communications? In the attempt to understand the role of advocacy think tanks in Members 
of Congress’s public facing communications, I first deconstruct how scholars conceptualize 
and categorize think tanks. Afterward, I explore the literature on the historical development 
and rise of think tanks. Furthermore, I analyze the scholarly literature on how think tanks 
develop networks and channels of information in an attempt to maximize visibility and 
credibility through political access. Finally, I consider and propose the theoretical framework 
of legislative informational organizing in relation to advocacy think tanks. Finally, I examine 
the gaps that exist within the literature and describe the area of investigation that this thesis 
researches in the following chapters. 
Conceptualizing Think Tanks and Their Typologies 
 
In the effort to address the research question above, it is necessary to analyze exactly what a 
think tank is and the rise of advocacy think tanks. Firstly, before conceptualizing think tanks, 
one must recognize that there is no objective definition of a think tank; in fact, scholars tend 
to “get bogged down in the vexed question of defining what we mean by ‘think tank’… an 
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exercise which often generates into futile semantics” (James 1998: 409-410). Due to the 
proliferation of think tanks in the last century, there truly is no typical think tank. They range 
in size, budgets, specializations, research output, ideological orientation, and institutional 
independence, all of which make it difficult to deconstruct the variations and similarities 
among the institutions.  
Additionally, scholars tend to examine think tanks through a different lens based on 
the time in which they conceptualized the institutions. In particular, the understanding of 
think tanks has continually developed through the last century, therefore, the institutions have 
been malleable in the ways that people understand them, the various purposes they serve, and 
their role in policy-making. As a result, in the effort to synthesize scholarly discussion on 
think tanks, it is necessary to briefly examine the two ways that scholars classify think tanks: 
broad and narrow classifications. 
Broad and Narrow Definitions  
Broad definitions of think tanks attempt to combine the features of think tanks into 
one concise and overarching definition. For example, James G. McGann (2016), a prominent 
think tank expert, defines think tanks as “organizations that generate policy-oriented 
research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues” (7) that can assist the 
public and policymakers alike in making informed decisions about policy issues. Similar to 
McGann, Bertelli and Wenger (2009) define think tanks as “independent policy research 
organizations that often combine research and advocacy” and through their organization, 
have a “commitment to support the promotion of research and ideas” (225). An older 
definition by Howlett and Ramesh (1995) describes think tanks as “independent 
organization[s] engaged in multi-disciplinary research intended to influence public policy” 
(58), which draws into question the differences between think tanks and academic 
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institutions. Finally, a more dynamic definition constructed by Rich (2004) recognizes think 
tanks as “independent, non-interest based, and nonprofit organizations that produce and 
principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and influence the policymaking 
process” (11). All four of these definitions have clear similarities that help to draw out major 
themes within the overall structures and goals of think tanks, but minor differences between 
each notably highlight the definitional difficulties of think tanks. 
Across all four of the definitions presented by McGann (2016), Bertelli and Wenger 
(2009), Howlett and Ramesh (1995), and Rich (2004), there is a clear emphasis on 
influencing policy, implying that think tanks have an integral purpose of conducting research 
meant to shape policy. By incorporating public policy as a component of defining think 
tanks, a clear link is developed between think tanks and Congress, therefore, changing the 
way in which scholars understand the role of think tanks at large. However, due to the broad 
nature of each of these definitions, one word can potentially change what can or cannot be 
included as a think tank. For example, between all three definitions, Bertelli and Wenger’s 
(2009) inclusion of the word advocacy suggests a more ideologically driven nature of think 
tanks compared to other definitions, especially McGann’s (2016). Additionally, when 
examining all of these definitions, it is important to compare the conceptualization of think 
tanks to other types of organizations, such as interest groups. Think tanks are one of many 
types of organizations that, in some way, try and shape public policy, which is why, 
according to Rich (2004), it is not entirely possible to distinguish all of these organizations 
because “institutional boundaries are frequently amorphous and overlapping” (11). However, 
despite the difficulty of drawing distinctions between think tanks and other institutions, 
Rich’s (2004) definition attempts to make these clarifications by incorporating terminology 
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within his definition, including non-interest based, and nonprofit organizations, to establish 
clear organizational structures of think tanks compared to the other definitions. Thus, while 
each broad definition across scholarly literature is useful in painting a more holistic picture of 
the functions, structures, and goals of think tanks, there are limitations when expanding the 
definitions too much.  
In order to encompass narrower and more in-depth conceptions of think tanks, 
Weaver (1989) and McGann (2016; 2005) break down the institutions into three categories: 
the contract researcher, Universities without students, and advocacy think tanks. However, 
before examining each typology in-depth, it is important to distinguish that these categories 
are meant to examine think tanks globally, not just in the United States. As a result, while 
these definitions help to understand the environment of think tanks, they have the potential to 
vastly differ in one country compared to another, and these differences must be noted within 
the context of United States think tanks. In addition, scholars have also recognized that think 
tanks have begun to expand into multiple categories, forming a sort of hybrid between each 
narrow conceptualization of the institutions. According to McGann (2016) “newly 
established think tanks have blurred the lines between these separate categories” (14), thus, 
drawing into question the historical purposes and functions of think tanks in comparison to 
how they continue to develop in the present and future. These limitations must be considered 
when conceptualizing think tanks, and while there is no perfect catch-all definition, by 
recognizing conceptual variations in the types of think tanks, one can begin to better 
deconstruct their behaviors, influence, and structures at large.  
The first category within the literature on narrow classifications of think tanks 
includes the contract researcher think tank, which is defined as a think tank that mainly 
 9 
focuses on the demands of the agencies that contract them (Weaver 1989). Contract research 
based think tanks have had a strong “reputation for objective research” (McGann 2016: 14) 
and the agencies that fund them play crucial roles in the development of their policy agenda. 
The functionality of contract think tanks has shifted in the United States, where contract 
think tanks have started to have strong ideological ties with the departments or agencies that 
contract them. The best example of this type of think tank is the Rand Corporation, which is 
mainly contracted by the United States Department of Defense. Despite having funding 
streams from a few other agencies, its main funding source has driven its success to be the 
nation’s leading national security based think tank (Hounshell 2000; J. A. Smith 1991). As a 
result, it is clear that contract think tanks in the United States tend to be driven through the 
agencies that fund their particular research goals and agendas, making them more specialized 
in certain policy areas than others. As a result, contract think tanks are oftentimes affiliated 
with a certain ideological base determined by their largest funders.  
A second category of think tanks presented by scholars is Universities without 
students. This category exemplifies the dominant formation of think tanks for decades 
leading up the 1970’s; while they still exist, they are minorities within think tank typologies 
(Stahl 2016). These think tanks rely heavily on academia to influence their policy research 
and recommendations, and while some question the differences between these think tanks 
and academic research, scholars argue that the main distinguishing factor between the two 
arises with a particular focus on public policy, reiterating previous interpretations of broad 
definitions of think tanks at large. According to Weaver (1989) the “main product of most of 
the studentless universities” (568) is books and monographs on particular policy issues, 
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making this type of think tank more skilled in complex and long-term research on policy 
issues at large compared to research on specific legislation. 
 A pertinent example of a think tank that falls within the category of Universities 
without students is the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI has traditionally fallen into 
this category, but has recently shifted its policy approach and outcomes, which reiterates the 
ways that modern day think tanks are blurring the lines between previously established 
categories. AEI has traditionally focused on more in-depth and long-term policy concerns, 
such as healthcare and economics, and published books and lengthy policy briefs on the 
issues. However, they have started to shift from this approach to construct more brief 
analyses of current legislation and have developed a digital platform to expand their reach 
(Rich 2004: 68). As a result, while AEI has traditionally been considered a University 
without students think tank, the shifting demand of think tanks has consequently diminished 
the pertinence of this category of think tanks, and many institutions that used to fall into this 
category have since blended into others. 
Advocacy think tanks represent the newest think tank model that has developed in 
recent years. According to Weaver (1989), advocacy think tanks “combine a strong policy, 
partisan, or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship and an effort to influence current 
policy debates” (567). These think tanks promote a certain viewpoint and their policy 
research is typically sharply partisan (McGann 2005). Scholars argue that compared to the 
other categories of think tanks, they spend less time developing their own and unique 
research compared to trying to synthesize existing research and ideas through advocacy 
networks. These think tanks have arguably had the most impact on public policy due to their 
access to policymakers, and they put a special emphasis on establishing their credibility in 
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the eyes of policymakers and developing reliable networks with Congress members 
(McGann 2016; Rich 2004). They specifically create research products that are “brief enough 
to read in a limousine ride from National Airport to Capitol Hill,” compared to the more in-
depth research products traditionally produced by Universities without students based think 
tanks (Weaver 1989: 568).  
Advocacy think tanks have proliferated since the 1970’s, whereas, according to Rich 
(2004), “as the number of think tanks has grown in recent decades, well more than half of 
those that have emerged have represented identifiable ideological proclivities in their 
missions and research” (10), thus significantly changing the think tank landscape in the 
United States as a whole. Of this category of think tanks, The Heritage Foundation, founded 
in 1973, clearly stands as one of the most prominent advocacy think tanks. According to 
scholars, Heritage changed the role of think tanks by mirroring “the momentum among the 
lobbyists and interest groups” (Graetz and Shapiro 2005: 89) and focusing on producing 
sharp conservative partisan research to directly influence policy. Through an exorbitant 
amount of funding compared to other think tanks, Heritage rapidly grew, moving 
significantly ahead in partisan think tank research “before the opposition even realized the 
game had begun” (Graetz and Shapiro 2005: 89). The proliferation of advocacy think tanks 
was swift and asymmetrical; conservative think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, grew 
faster in numbers, funding, and networks (M. A. Smith 2011). This growth led to an 
“overwhelming majority of these ideological think tanks” to be “broadly conservative, 
producing work that favors limited government, free enterprise, and personal freedom,” 
which has drastically shaped the influence and reach of various advocacy think tanks as a 
whole (Rich 2004: 10). This category of think tanks is the central focus of this thesis, and 
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while the broad definitions help to categorize the overall context of the institutions, the 
emergence of advocacy think tanks is a primary focus in the study and examination of later 
determined variables and methods of study. 
When analyzing the rise of advocacy think tanks, it is also important to consider other 
elements within the political system that have impacted or paralleled the proliferation of 
these institutions. In particular, the asymmetrical rise of conservative think tanks compared to 
liberal think tanks aligns with the asymmetrical polarization of Republicans and Democrats 
in Congress since 1970 (Campbell 2016). According to Thomas E. Mann, of the Brookings 
Institute, and Norman J. Ornstein of AEI, (2016) Republicans have “become ideologically 
extreme; scornful of compromise…and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political 
opposition” (103). While Democrats have also become more polarized, they have not shifted 
as far to the left as the that Republicans have shifted to the right (Mann and Ornstein 2016: 
103). This trend of asymmetrical polarization, according to M. A. Smith (2011), is similarly 
reflected when examining the landscape of advocacy think tanks and their ideological ties. 
While polarization is not the focus of this thesis, it is important to understand the political 
conditions in which advocacy think tanks have thrived. 
As the political conditions in the U.S. have become more divisive and partisan, it is 
necessary to analyze the various ideological make-ups of these think tanks prior to 
deconstructing their historical development in the effort to better understand the existing 
advocacy think tank landscape. Advocacy think tanks represent four main categories on the 
political spectrum, including conservative, libertarian, centrist, and progressive think tanks 
(McGann 2016: 47). As of 2015, according to the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program 
database (McGann 2016), when breaking down the ideological affiliation of United States 
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think tanks, 26% are nonpartisan, 20% are conservative, 13% are progressive, and 3% are 
libertarian. However, according to various scholars, including Abelson (2006), McGann 
(2016) and Weaver (1989), oftentimes think tanks that fall within the advocacy category and 
label themselves as nonpartisan are typically not completely nonpartisan but will identify as 
such in order to garner more credibility and access on the Hill. A good example of this 
includes the Brookings Institute, which officially classifies itself as nonpartisan, and does 
research at a more ideologically balanced level, but has produced more progressive policy 
briefs than conservative based research, causing critics to accuse it of being a liberal think 
tank (Stahl 2016: 50-51). Clearly, the emergence of advocacy think tanks has changed their 
ideological make-up and the type of information, ideas, and research they produce.  
These three typologies of think tanks paint a narrower picture of the broader 
definitions offered by other scholars, and thus, can be used to better understand that think 
tanks are not necessarily one thing, but instead, have the ability to function differently with 
the similar goal of generating policy research meant to inform the public and policymakers in 
different ways through different approaches. The various conceptualizations of think tanks 
provide a deeper understanding of what the institutions are and what they typically look like. 
From these conceptualizations, it is important to historically examine the proliferation of 
think tanks, particularly advocacy think tanks, in the process of analyzing the demand of the 
institutions and the resulting supply of information that has arisen. 
Historical Context of Think Tanks and Their Growth  
 
 In order to examine the proliferation of advocacy think tanks, it is necessary to first analyze 
their historical growth. In order to do this, one must look beyond just their rapid rise in the 
1970’s and examine the original functions and role of the institutions prior to the emergence 
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of advocacy think tanks. Scholars tend to break the historical development of think tanks into 
three distinct waves. The first wave takes place from 1900-1945, the second wave follows the 
end of World War II from 1946-1970, and the third wave from 1971-1989. These waves are 
integral to understanding the history and development of think tanks and serve as useful tools 
when deconstructing the overall societal influences that contributed to the proliferation of 
think tanks at large. 
The First Wave (1900-1945) 
 
When looking back to the beginning of think tank existence, it must first be understood that 
“think tanks have long dotted the American political landscape,” (Smith 2011: 86) and a 
handful of them were founded in the early twentieth century, such as the Brookings 
Institution and the Russell Sage Foundation. The earliest think tanks were “viewed as centres 
or institutes that carried out research and provided advice from several ideological 
perspectives” (Salas-Porras and Murray 2017: 1) and emphasized “maintaining balance and 
objectivity” (Smith 2011: 86). According to Abelson (2006), the need and demand for think 
tank arose from philanthropists and policymakers believing institutions were needed outside 
of universities “whose primary focus was not teaching but research and analysis” (22). This 
idea led a small group of people to “establish privately funded research institutions” (22) 
meant to guide policy issues and serve the public interest. Some of the early think tank 
founders included Robert Brookings, of the Brookings Institute, Andrew Carnegie, Herbert 
Hoover, John D. Rockefeller Sr., and Margaret Olivia Sage (Abelson 2006: 22).  
After their creation, these think tanks represented the think tank category of 
Universities without students, clearly staying away from sharp ideological research and 
focusing more on long-term policy concerns (McGann 2016; Stahl 2016). For example, the 
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Brookings Institute, founded in 1916, was “fundamentally dedicated to the idea of 
‘nonpartisan’ technocratic expertise” (Stahl 2016: 8). According to Stahl (2016), the main 
purpose Brookings was “to stand above specific economic, political, or class interests and to 
speak for the general welfare of society” through scientific policy research and 
recommendations (8). As the leader of think tanks then, and as a prominent one now, 
Brookings clearly demonstrates the think tank approach in the first wave of think tanks and 
highlights their lack of ideological ties (Abelson 2006: 23). 
The Second Wave (1946-1970) 
 
The second wave of think tanks quickly emerged following the end of World War II, “largely 
in response to growing international and domestic pressures confronting American 
policymakers” (Abelson 2006: 28). At this point in time, the contractor think tank began to 
emerge, which juxtapose the University without students model by agencies directly 
contracting think tanks to produce specific policy research relevant to their fields (Bertelli 
and Wenger 2009: 229). According to Abelson (2006), there was a demand for scientific and 
defense-based research, and “by tapping into the expertise of engineers, physicists, 
biologists, statisticians, and social scientists” (28), policymakers aimed at combatting the 
new problems that confronted the United States as its position as a hegemonic power in the 
atomic age. For example, in 1952, think tank Resources for the Future (RFF) received 
funding from the Ford Foundation to study conservation, development, and natural resources 
meant to provide policymakers with vital information needed to construct informed policy in 
these areas (McGann 2016: 26). Additionally, RAND quickly arose as a leader for defense 
policy research and provided vital information on national security issues that also assisted 
the United States in its legislative Cold War efforts (Abelson 2006: 29; Bertelli and Wenger 
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2009: 230). Overall, the “onset of the Cold War and the war on poverty placed new demands 
on the United States government and provided new opportunities for think tanks to make 
their presence felt” (Abelson 2006: 29). It was within this wave that the demand for think 
tanks began to rise, which set the stage for the proliferation of these institutions in the third 
wave. 
The Third Wave (1971-1989) 
 
It was in the third wave that the advocacy think tank quickly arose in the think tank world 
and has since taken over the majority of the think tank landscape in the United States. This 
type of think tank grew out of a “profound determination to market their ideas to various 
target audiences” (Abelson 2006: 31) rather than committing to objective research that 
previously guided research in the first and second waves. These think tanks became 
immersed in the political arena and focused on the development of networks and channels 
with policymakers in order to have the most influence on policy at large. According to 
Medvetz (2012), the rise of advocacy think tanks aimed at satisfying the “desperate daily 
need for intellectual meat to feed the hearings, the speeches, [and] the unrelenting policy 
grinder” (6). For advocacy hink tanks, “research became a weapon of political struggle, a 
means of championing a vision for society and public policy” (M. A. Smith 2011: 87) which 
reshaped the ways that think tanks functioned, resulting in the institutions becoming “larger, 
more complex, and more dynamic than ever before”(McGann 2016: 44). In particular, 
advocacy think tanks shifted the “ideological hue” of the research they conducted (Graetz 
and Shapiro 2005: 85). This ideological shift “narrowed the space in which think tanks 
operate…limiting the range of policy choices that they might consider,” (McGann 2016: 45) 
and changed the overall goals, functions, and role of think tanks at large. The third wave 
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shaped the current climate of think tanks; most of them favoring an ideology that drives their 
policy research, suggesting that in the world of think tanks, partisan politics are pertinent 
(McGann 2016: 45).  
The Current Think Tank Landscape 
 
The third wave of think tanks officially began in 1971 and the changes that occurred have 
continued to shape the overall landscape of think tanks in the United States. The amount of 
think tanks has more than doubled since 1980 and 90.5 percent of think tanks in the United 
States were created since 1951 (McGann 2018: 10). Given this timeline, more and more think 
tanks emerged that followed the ideological structure designed by advocacy think tanks. 
Currently, according to the 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, there are 1,872 
think tanks in the United States, which is more than any other country in the world (McGann 
2018). Most of these think tanks are advocacy think tanks, and since they rely heavily on the 
establishment of networks and channels of information, they also rely heavily on funding, 
access, and perceptions of credibility (Rich 2004). These driving factors considerably impact 
the ways that think tanks conduct their research and have an important impact on how 
advocacy think tanks influence policymakers and their collection of information. 
Think Tank Networks and Channels of Information 
 
Advocacy think tanks shifted the traditional roles of think tanks by emphasizing ideological 
principles within research meant to influence public policy. As a result, these think tanks 
devote “as much or more effort to spreading the implications of their research than to 
completing or acquiring it,” (M. A. Smith 2011: 87) demonstrating the new emphasis on 
establishing networks in order to garner as much influence as possible. Efforts toward the 
establishment of informational networks with policymakers, the media, and even the public, 
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have become a central focus in the development and spread of think tank research. However, 
as a result, according to McGann (2016), “as think tanks have become increasingly focused 
in their efforts to ensure visibility, questions have surfaced pertaining to the reliability and 
credibility of published and publicized work” (57). Thus, it is vital to look beyond the scope 
of think tanks and their historical growth to understand the structures of advocacy think tanks 
in their continuous effort to influence society and public policy. Literature on the 
opportunities of access that think tanks have in the United States, the networks and channels 
of information they create, and their attempts at establishing credibility, all provide a better 
understanding of how advocacy think tanks profusely work to connect with key players in the 
relentless policy process of American politics.  
Political Access and Opportunity  
 
Within think tank literature, many scholars attempt to explain factors within the United States 
that have enabled advocacy think tanks to proliferate at such extraordinary rates compared to 
think tanks in other countries that greatly lag behind. While there is no clear answer to this 
question, many scholars, including Abelson (2006), McGann (2016), and Stone and Denham 
(2004), argue that structures in the United States, in terms of political systems and the 
dispersion of information, have provided immense opportunities for think tanks to gain 
political access within the policy-making process. In particular, United States political 
structures have created a conducive environment for think tanks; they have constant 
opportunities to attract attention “ranging from testifying before congressional committees 
and delivering by hand concise summaries of key policy issues to members of Congress to 
inviting representatives and senators, as well as their staff, to participate in seminars and 
workshops” (Abelson 2006: 63). Additionally, “the nature of debate in legislative committees 
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drives a demand for strategic information, and the benefactors of think tanks, seeing a market 
opportunity, create and maintain the organizations which supply that information” (Bertelli 
and Wenger 2009: 225). These various opportunities for advocacy think tanks to expand their 
reach are driving forces within the supply and demand of ideologically driven research 
within the think tank world.  
While political access clearly expands the ability of think tanks to connect with 
policymakers, it is important to also consider if increased political access leads to increased 
policy influence. Within think tank literature, scholars do argue that with more political 
access comes more political influence. For example, according to Lerner (2018), think tanks 
that have more access and connections with policymakers have a larger reach of influence on 
public policy. Lerner argues that this extended reach results in advocacy think tanks being 
incorporated more within the political processes of policy-making, including committee 
hearings and the development of legislation. According to McGann (2016), “think tanks in 
the United States have more of an impact on public policy compared with their counterparts 
in other countries” (55), and increased political access is a driving force behind their 
increased influence. Thus, political access is a central component of how advocacy think 
tanks connect their ideologically driven research with policymakers and is the first step of 
many that strategically assists think tanks in expanding their policy reach. 
Networks and Channels of Information 
 
After establishing that think tanks have opportunities to gain political access through United 
States federal systems, it is necessary to look further as to how these institutions seek to 
establish networks and channels of information that allow them to expand their outreach and 
influence. Advocacy think tanks actively market their studies to policymakers and journalists 
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in the attempt to build their networks and channels of information (McGann 2016). The best 
example of how much of a priority marketing is to advocacy think tanks is displayed in 
Andrews's (1989) article “So You Want To Start a Think Tank” in Policy Review, which tells 
think tanks that: 
Everything you do, every day, must involve marketing in as many as six 
dimensions. Market your policy recommendations, market the principles and 
values behind them, market the tangible publications and events your 
organization is producing. Market the think tank concept itself. Then market 
your specific organization. And never stop marketing yourself and the other key 
individuals who personify the organization. (64) 
Marketing, as apparent from Andrew’s (1989) account, is a primary component of how think 
tanks seek to establish networks. Through marketing initiatives, think tanks can meet 
policymakers, spread their ideas and research, and maintain connections that are vital to 
capitalizing on the political access that think tanks need in order to be as influential as 
possible. According to Rich (2004), marketing helps establish high visibility and attempts to 
solidify funding from competitor think tanks; thus, “the increased number of think tanks 
leads to an increased emphasis on marketing expertise” (67).  
Some common marketing forms for think tanks include sending copies of studies, 
with shortened summaries, to legislators, staffers, administrators, and journalists. Think tanks 
expand their networking through holding “conferences and forums to facilitate their 
personnel’s contact with reporters and policymakers” (M. A. Smith 2011: 87). Another 
growing form of marketing for advocacy think tanks concerns the media; researchers are 
constantly seeking to appear on radio shows or television and “several think tanks have high 
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profiles in the media to retain control over their public images” (McGann 2016: 57). 
Additionally, as technology and social media continue to expand, think tanks and their 
researchers use social media as a platform to engage a variety of audiences and networks. 
The use of the media as a marketing tool has become so pervasive in think tank networking 
goals that they “diligently track their citations in the mass media” (M. A. Smith 2011: 88) 
and use these citations in grant and donation seeking efforts by using fundraising techniques 
to demonstrate the reach of their policy research. For example, the Cato Institute, a 
prominent libertarian think tank that was founded in 1977, references their citations in their 
annual reports. In particular, in their 2002 report, they noted having “448 major television 
appearances, 483 radio appearances, and 474 citations along with 118 op-eds in high-
circulation newspapers” (M. A. Smith 2011: 88). 
 Through networking, and the development of channels of information with 
policymakers and other notable groups, think tanks attempt to capitalize on their political 
access (Rich 2004). However, networking also has a key purpose of attempting to establish 
credibility, or at least the perception of credibility, because in order for policy research to be 
influential, it must be seen as a credible source of information useful in the policy-making 
process as a whole. Another facet of the development of think tank networks is the 
component of what base a particular think tank aims to reach. Advocacy think tanks clearly 
have ideological ties that shape their target market, and through intense marketing strategies, 
think tanks strive to develop channels of information with legislators, journalists, and 
portions of the public that agree with the partisan foundations of the research that think tanks 
produce.  
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Perceptions of Credibility 
  
Credibility is a central force within the establishment of networks and through the use of 
political access, making it one of the most important facets of think tank outreach. The effort 
toward gaining credibility in the eyes of policymakers is directly tied to think tanks’ desire to 
have as much influence as possible over the policy-making process. Thus, having influence is 
intrinsically tied to having credibility. However, according to Abelson (2006), “having 
influence is something all think tanks covet but in reality, most settle for the perception of 
exercising influence,” (171) suggesting that the simple perception of influence is oftentimes 
enough to help think tanks establish some degree of credibility.  
Additionally, not only is the credibility of think tank research important, but so is the 
credibility of the legislator. According to Bertelli and Wenger (2009) “the transmission of 
information depends on the credibility of the legislator announcing that information” (228), 
which arguably shapes the types of information that policymakers will seek out and use in 
order to refine their own credibility. Thus, the credibility of legislators is impacted by the 
credibility of their information and think tanks can help “provide legislators with that 
credibility through research that supports their ideological policy preferences” (Bertelli and 
Wenger 2009: 228). As policymakers seek to create legislation in alignment with their policy 
positions and ideological foundations, they often seek out think tank information that will 
credibly align with their own stances. As a result, think tanks, knowing that legislators value 
the credibility of the information they decide to transmit, seek to establish credibility as an 
accredited institution that produces consistent research supporting ideological bases in 
alignment with what partisan policymakers support (Rich 2004: 102).  
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When examining the current policy-making climate within the U.S., the increasing 
polarization between Republican and Democratic parties have increased demand for more 
ideologically divided information to feed into this polarization (M. A. Smith 2011). As a 
result, think tanks, which are knowingly aware of the polarization that exists in Congress and 
in the U.S., deliberately target policymakers that will be receptive to the ideological research 
conducted by each particular think tank. For example, the Heritage Foundation clearly lays 
out its ideological hue by stating that its mission “is to formulate and promote conservative 
public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual 
freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense” (The Heritage 
Foundation 2018). The Heritage Foundation markets itself as a conservative think tank, and 
as a result, seeks to develop networks with conservative channels. The think tank, as a result, 
does not target its research at liberal legislators, and understands that its market falls in 
alignment with its public ideological position. This marketing strategy is highlighted by Rich 
(2004), who argues that “think tanks that are ideological or aggressively marketing-oriented 
obtain different kinds of visibility with congressional staff and journalists,” which impacts 
“how they are viewed and how their work is received by policymaking audiences” (75). The 
various visibility complexes that result in how advocacy think tanks position themselves 
ideologically through marketing strategies has consequences on their perceptions of 
credibility with policymakers. 
Congressional Informational Organizing 
 
In the effort to understand the relationship between think tanks and policymakers, it is 
essential to examine legislative organization as a main component of what drives the supply 
and demand of these two variables. In particular, according to Krehbiel (2010), legislative 
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organizing “refers to the allocation of resources and assignment of parliamentary rights to 
individual legislators or groups of legislators” (2). This concept frames how policymakers 
decide to organize their resources, particularly their gathering and use of information. The 
informational organizing of policymakers impacts both “the performance of individual 
legislators within the legislature,” and “the performance of the legislature within the political 
system” (Krehbiel 2010: 2). Thus, the concept of legislative organizing has important 
implications for the development of policy and the institutions of policy-making. Within 
legislative organizing, scholars have developed informational theories of legislative 
organizing that examine the ongoing conflict within Congress for policymakers to become 
specialized on certain areas of policy (Krehbiel 2010: 68). However, the theory claims that 
the “the legislative committee structure facilitates issue experts and serves to mediate the 
need for every legislator to be deeply informed on every issue” (Ness 2010). This system 
results in legislators typically becoming “issue experts on one or two policy issues to the 
legislative organizational structure,” demonstrating a need for information to assist 
legislators in developing issue expertise in certain policy areas.  This need is explored by 
May, Koski, and Stramp (2016), who argue that these structures make expertise in policy-
making a pertinent part of legislating, and thus, legislators must gather different sources and 
types of information to fill this demand.  
Through the lens of informational congressional organization, think tanks attempt to 
serve as institutions to fill a need for policy expertise, and the demand for information is only 
increasing. According to Bertelli and Wenger (2009), as polarization increases in Congress, 
policymakers have increased demand for ideologically driven information, which leads to an 
increase in supply of advocacy think tanks. The scholars argue that “the nature of debate in 
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legislative committees drives a demand for strategic information, and the benefactors of think 
tanks, seeing a market opportunity, create and maintain the organizations which supply that 
information” (Bertelli and Wenger 2009: 225). This demand is driven by the position of think 
tanks as “specialist suppliers of information” that are able to “target legislators who are 
unlikely to substitute support for the think tank’s policy position with an opposing stance” 
(Bertelli and Wenger 2009: 228). Scholars argue, based upon informational organizing 
theory, that congressional members are constantly seeking to find information that allows 
them to become issue experts, and as polarization has increased, the two parties “have 
exerted pressure on committee members to obtain information useful for partisan warfare” 
(Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones 2016: 179).  
Expanding the Literature  
 
The collection of literature on think tanks, particularly advocacy think tanks, and their 
connection with policy-making, answers and leaves numerous questions moving forward. 
Within think tank literature, scholars continuously debate the extent of think tank influence 
on the development of public policy. The ongoing question of think tank influence has been 
examined in various ways through different methodologies, and while no scholar has 
objectively answered the question, there are certainly varied perspectives on the impact of 
think tank research on policy at large. While policy represents a fundamental part of the 
outcome of policy-making, the think tank literature does not explore what happens before 
policy creation or even before committee discussion over certain policy, and as a result, it is 
difficult to gauge the ways that Members of Congress engage in congressional informational 
organizing in relation to think tanks.  
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The process of congressional informational organizing is an integral part of how 
congressional members gather, understand, and implement information in their effort to 
become policy entrepreneurs and experts in various policy areas. Without examining this 
process within the context of think tank research, researchers are unsure to how research is 
used and gathered beyond the marketing strategies of think tanks, leaving a significant gap 
within the scholarly literature on this phenomenon. Additionally, in the new technological 
age of policy-making, Members of Congress now utilized social media platforms including 
Twitter and Facebook, which serves as a public platform for legislators to employ public 
relations techniques regarding their policy positions and initiatives. In particular, according 
to Lerner (2018), an integral gap that needs to be studied as think tank research expands is a 
study that incorporates social media analysis as a methodological approach. If social media 
analysis is studied, the implications of the use of technology in connection with legislative 
informational organization can be further examined and the consequences of these results can 
be considered within future research and understanding of these variables. 
In order to build out of the gaps in research and lack of analysis in the process of 
informational organizing compared to the results, this thesis seeks to challenge the common 
model that has been implicit in the work of think tank scholars (Figure 2.1), which tends to 
assume that think tank research has the power to sway Members of Congress’s policy 
preferences in the attempt to influence policy. This model derives out of a lack of research in 
the legislative informational gathering process of congressional members in relation to think 
tanks. The lack of research in this area has resulted in scholars assuming that policy 




Figure 2.1: Common Model of Think Tank Impact on Legislative Informational Organizing 
 
 
In response to the common model, this thesis proposes that rather than think tanks 
producing information and research to shape legislative preferences, that Members of 
Congress have existing policy preferences embedded in ideological beliefs. Through existing 
legislative preferences, this thesis proposes an alternative model (Figure 2.2) that poses think 
tank research as an element of informational gathering that helps support these existing 
policy preferences, rather than changing them. In juxtaposition to the common model, this 
model does not view policy preferences as malleable, and instead, argues that think tanks 
help provide ideologically based information meant to help support these existing positions 
instead of altering them. 
Figure 2.2: Alternative Model of Think Tank Impact on Legislative Informational Organizing 
 
This thesis proposes the alternative model as a guide to apply how the research of advocacy 
think tanks is used in Members of Congress’s legislative informational organizing, and how 
Think Tank Research
Legislative Preferences 




this process works when considering the various policy preferences of legislators. The 
alternative model considers the gaps in the think tank literature that tend to overlook the 
process of how Members of Congress consider and use think tank research. 
 After considering the common and alternative models proposed within the context of 
the gap in research of think tank information and congressional informational organizing, it is 
important to examine the work that still needs to be done. By studying the process of 
informational gathering and organizing, one can better understand the roles of advocacy 
think tanks in the development of policy, and how congressional members sort through and 
use various research from these institutions. Furthermore, by analyzing how Members of 
Congress engage with think tank research through the use of social media, we can better 
understand the plethora of ways that legislators engage with and use policy information and 
consider the impacts this usage may have. This approach helps in analyzing how effective the 
existing marketing and distribution of information efforts of think tanks are when engaging 
legislative members on particular topics. Additionally, by filling this gap, this thesis hopes to 
evaluate if and how legislators incorporate this ideologically based research when serving as 
policy experts and entrepreneurs. From this research, the consequences of these findings can 
be analyzed when examining the role of advocacy think tank information in policy-making.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
 
The previous chapter explored think tank and informational organizing literature in 
the attempt to better understand advocacy think tanks and their role in the policy-making 
process. Despite the wide array of literature that exists on the topic, there are gaps within 
scholarly discourse regarding the ways in which think tank research is used by Members of 
Congress throughout the process of policy-making and not just policy outcomes. As a result, 
this thesis builds off of the proposed alternative model (Figure 3.1) explained at the end of 
Chapter 2, and asks the following question: How and to what extent is think tank research 
used in Members of Congress’s public facing communications?  With the alternative model 
in mind, I hypothesize that legislators use think tank research as a public relations tool when 
appealing to their constituents and in policy-making. 
Figure 3.1: Alternative Model of Think Tank Impact on Legislative Informational Organizing 
 
In response to the research question at hand, this thesis posits the following hypotheses in 
response: 




H1B: Members of Congress also reference think tank information from think tanks with 
opposing ideology within their public facing communications  
 
H2A: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that ideologically align with their party to support their policy positions through citations of 
studies or statistics. 
 
H2B: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that do not ideologically align with their party to either support their policy position more by 
mentioning that even think tanks on the other end of the aisle agree with certain policy 
positions or to discredit the credibility of the think tank.  
 
Mixed Methods Approach 
 
This thesis evaluates the proposed hypotheses through a mixed methods approach involving 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. This thesis collects, extracts, and examines data 
using Quorum Federal by analyzing the mentions of think tanks and think tank research in 
floor speech’s given by Members of Congress and mentions on social media platforms, 
including Twitter and Facebook. The quantitative methods section provides a better 
understanding of the ways in which legislators engage with think tank information. 
Additionally, through content analyses of the citations of think tanks by legislators, I evaluate 
the role that policy preferences play in citations of corresponding ideological think tanks and 
opposing ideological think tanks. The quantitative methods and content analysis chapters 
incorporate varied modes of study in the effort to fill existing gaps in the literature and 
approach the research question of this thesis in two unique ways. Additionally, both methods 
complement each other by supporting two different aspects within the legislative 
informational organizing processes of congressional members by using the same unit of 






In direct response to the proposed gaps in literature put forth by Lerner (2018), this thesis 
empirically examines the trends within the usage of individual verbiage concerning think 
tank information and research. These mentions include the evaluation of three components of 
public engagement, including floor speeches, tweets from Members of Congress on Twitter, 
and posts by Members of Congress on Facebook. Through the examination of three key data 
areas, content validity is established as all three areas poise a separate niche within the ways 
that legislators issue public statements and establish their public presence. The data for these 
three areas of quantitative analysis was gathered using the database Quorum Federal. 
Quorum Federal provides updated content from legislators on all three areas of public facing 
communication and provides data analytics for search results. The database also has a 
plethora of data available and clear and concise information on the individual legislator 
issuing the public statement, making it easy to maintain the unit of analysis and to produce 
meaningful results. 
  By analyzing mentions of think tanks in floor speeches, I consider the pertinence of 
think tank research in the policy-making process, particularly in the context of when 
congressional informational theory is used on the House and Senate floors while being 
publicly recorded. The public record of these speeches represents a key way in which 
Members of Congress can speak upon and advocate for their policy preferences and 
suggestions, making floor speeches an important mode of communication to study in 
response to H1A and H1B. 
 In addition to floor speeches, the use of social media as a method of releasing public 
statements is an area of think tank research that not only has yet to be studied but has key 
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implications in the ways that social media is being increasingly used as a tool for Members of 
Congress. In particular, as social media continues to grow as a tool utilized by legislators, it 
is becoming more important for political scientists to examine the use of social media in 
connection with policy-making. I chose Twitter and Facebook as the two social media 
platforms to be analyzed through quantitative methods. This decision was due to the 
prominence of Members of Congress on both platforms and the varied character count and 
interactive interface of each platform, making them similar in terms of social media, but 
different in terms of post capability. In particular, Twitter only allows for 280 characters in a 
Tweet compared to Facebook allowing for 63,206 characters (Mergel 2012). The use of these 
two platforms are filtered when searching Quorum Federal in the same way that I analyze 
floor speeches. 
 Hypotheses H1A and H1B are studied through the quantitative collection and analysis 
of these three modes of public facing communication. In order to collect the data, the specific 
name and/or acronyms of prominent think tanks in the United States are searched. In total, 
twenty think tanks are searched as terms used within Tweets, Facebook posts, and floor 
speeches by Members of Congress. I determined the number of think tanks searched by using 
James McGann’s (2018) 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. Within this report, 
McGann (2018) ranks 90 of the top think tanks within the United States defining the ranking 
as such: 
This category is dedicated to the leading institutions in the United States of 
America. These think tanks excel in research, analysis, and public engagement 
on a wide range of policy issues with the aim of advancing debate, facilitating 
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cooperation between relevant actors, maintaining public support and funding, 
and improving the overall quality of life in the United States (McGann 2018). 
Since McGann’s list includes more than just advocacy think tanks, I narrowed the selection 
to twenty think tanks in order to maintain research feasibility and to eliminate think tanks 
outside of Washington, D.C. as well as think tanks that do not focus primarily on influencing 
policy on the Hill (namely University without students think tanks). The full list of think 
tanks that I search for in the quantitative methods portion of this thesis can be found in Table 
3.2. 
Each think tank, within the twenty that are searched, are entered in using the search 
bar on Quorum Federal. After the think tank name is searched, the document type is checked 
for each category one by one, including floor speeches, Twitter, and Facebook. For each 
document type, data is extracted using Quorum Federal’s data extraction tools for results on 
the amount of mentions within each public facing communication mode. The results are 
limited between the time frame of January 01, 2010-Janaury 27, 2019. These dates were 
determined based on the prevalence of the social media platforms expanding in 2010 and the 
cut-off date was based on the dates and time the data could be collected within the limitations 
of this thesis. The data integral to this analysis includes the party composition percentage of 
mentions made by Democrats and Republicans as well as the numerical data for numbers of 
think tank citations by legislators within the time-frame. 
After extracting the data, the findings are analyzed in relation to H1A and H1B. In 
regard to H1A, prominence is measured through a quantitative analysis of how frequently 
each think tank is mentioned and then added together across the twenty think tanks that are 
examined. Afterward, the number of mentions of the think tanks per month for the past nine 
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years are compared to well-known institutions and sources as a comparison to how often 
think tanks are mentioned. There are ten comparisons of notable sources (Table 3.2) that are 
used as a data reference point for the past years (from 2010-2018) when determining the 
average amount of mentions across these sources per month. The list of these sources was 
determined using the research of Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and Iyengar and Hahn (2009) 
who explore prominent media sources and their ideological leanings. The research produced 
by both sets of scholars helps provide a comprehensive list of news sources that would can be 
somewhat comparable when measuring the prominence of think tank mentions in public 
facing communications.  
Additionally, due to the nature of this thesis’s study, identifying comparable sources 
with a variety of ideological ties mimics the list of think tanks studied well, all varying from 
conservative, centrist, and liberal leanings. While the comparison has flaws as to the type of 
information produced between think tanks and the media institutions both report information 
that can be relayed cohesively in Members of Congress’s public facing communications. 
However, it should be noted that due to the nature of the research at each respective 
institution, think tanks are positioned more in relation to policy while news sources are 
positioned more toward the spread and reporting of information (Groseclose and Milyo 
2005). As a result, this comparison is not used to entirely support H1A but used as a reference 
point in understanding the percentage of think tank mentions in comparison to the news 
sources. Once the totals of think tank mentions are added together, they are quantitatively 
compared to the number of mentions per month of the media sources in Table 3.1, where 




Table 3.1: Table of comparable news sources that are used to analyze mentions think tank per month  
Comparable News Sources 
Fox News 
Washington Times 
New York Times  
PBS   
CNN   
ABC Good Morning America (GMA) 
USA Today  
National Public Radio (NPR) 
BBC 
The Economist  
 
If the number of think tank mentions across the dataset is consistently comparable to 
the results of the other media sources per month for the past eight years, then it is accepted as 
prominent. The cap was determined with the prominence of social media platforms as a tool 
for Members of Congress’s public facing communications in mind. In particular, the use of 
social media as a political tool first gained prominence in 2008 with the Obama campaign 
which served as a catalyst for politicians to begin using the platforms shortly thereafter 
(Vonderschmitt 2012). By capping the time period of prominence to 2010, I consider the 
time it took for Members of Congress to begin using these platforms and the available data 
from these platforms on Quorum Federal from 2010-2018. 
When evaluating H1B, I compare and contrast the number of think tank mentions by 
party composition and categorize the twenty think tanks that are searched by three different 
categories: conservative leaning, centrist leaning, and liberal leaning. These classifications 
are based on ideological content classifications within James McGann’s (2018) 2017 Global 
Go To Think Tank Index Report and through content analysis of the websites of each think 
tank regarding their position philosophy and goals. These classifications are listed in Table 
3.2, which also displays the twenty think tanks that are searched. Once each think tank is 
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classified, it is examined with the context of its ideological leaning in relation to the party 
composition of the Members mentioning the think tank in their floor speeches, tweets on 
Twitter, and Facebook posts. Each think tank labeled as either liberal or conservative leaning 
is added up as to the percentage of mentions by party composition and through a detailed 
analysis of these findings, H1B is accepted if there are consistent mentions by opposite party 
members across all ideological think tanks. Centrist leaning think tanks are not be considered 
within the examination of H1B due to the difficulty in measuring what the opposite party 
would be when the think tank proclaims to be, and is often classified as, centrist. Overall, out 
of the twenty think tanks, six are labeled as centrist and fourteen are categorized by either 
conservative or liberal leaning. 
Table 3.2: Table of think tanks that are quantitatively searched and their corresponding ideological leaning 
Think Tank Ideological Category  
Brookings Institution  Liberal Leaning  
Heritage Foundation  Conservative Leaning  
Cato Institute  Conservative Leaning  
Urban Institute  Liberal Leaning  
New America Foundation  Centrist Leaning  
Hoover Institute  Conservative Leaning  
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) Conservative Leaning  
Center for American Progress  Liberal Leaning  
Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) Conservative Leaning  
Progressive Policy Institute  Liberal Leaning  
Center for Strategic and International Studies Centrist Leaning  
RAND Corporation Centrist Leaning  
Center for Economic and Policy Research  Liberal Leaning  
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research  Conservative Leaning  
Hudson Institute  Conservative Leaning  
Atlantic Council Centrist Leaning  
Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) Centrist Leaning  
Economic Policy Institute (EPI) Liberal Leaning  
Human Rights Watch (HRW) Liberal Leaning  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Centrist Leaning  
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Content Analysis Method 
 
In order to provide context to the data collected within the quantitative methods chapter, I 
apply a qualitative content analysis method when examining think tank mentions by 
legislators in their public facing communications from January 01, 2010-January 27, 2019. 
The use of content analysis helps to directly evaluate the content within the mentions of think 
tanks by Members of Congress and allows me to directly evaluate H2A and H2B. The use of 
content analysis enables me to objectively, systematically, and quantitatively examine the 
qualitative features of Members of Congress’s communication (Feliciano 1967: 16). Due to 
the partisan nature of the positioning of Members of Congress and ideological think tanks, I 
rely on the ideological categorizations of the twenty think tanks found in Table 3.2 and 
conduct a content analysis only on the seven conservative and seven liberal think tanks. By 
examining think tanks that have an ideological leaning, I am able to directly contrast the 
results by each Member of Congress by party and ideological think tank mention; thus, 
creating a comparable and reliable sample set for a content analysis. 
There are a total of 3,314 think tank mentions by legislators within the timeframe, 
displayed in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 in Chapter 5. Within the context of this thesis, the entire 
population of public facing communications within this time frame is too large to entirely 
study. As a result, I systematically sample 15% of the 3,314 think tank mentions. In order to 
determine the amount of think tank documents I sample for each think tank, I divide the total 
of think tank mentions per each think tank, which are listed in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 in Chapter 
5, by 6.6 and round the result either up or down so that each sample is a whole number. The 
think tank, total mentions, and sample that I collect and examine in relation to H2A and H2B 
are listed in Table 3.3  
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Table 3.3: Table of documents per each think tank collected within the sample of the total population of public 
facing communications 
 
Think Tank Total Sample 
Heritage Foundation 1100 167 
Cato Institute 201 30 
ATR 310 47 
AEI 250 38 
Manhattan Institute 52 8 
Hoover Institute 53 8 
Hudson Institute 51 8 
Center for American Progress 433 66 
Brookings Institution 252 38 
Human Rights Watch 166 25 
Economic Policy Institute 285 43 
Center for Economic and Policy Research 34 5 
Urban Institute 112 17 
Progressive Policy Institute 15 2 
 3314 502 
 
From these calculations, I examine 502 public facing communications by Members of 
Congress within the time period listed above. In order to collect the 502 documents, I 
individually search each of the fourteen conservative and liberal think tanks in Quorum 
Federal. I apply filters on the three types of selected public facing communications (floor 
speeches, Tweets, and Facebook posts), a filter on legislators as the mentioning source, and 
apply a filter on the dates mentioned above. Once the think tank is searched with these filters, 
I download a spreadsheet of the results and randomly choose a number between 1-7. After 
the document is collected, I repeat the process of randomly choosing a number between 1-7 
to decide which document to choose next. The systematic sampling process increases the 
reliability of the results in reflection of the population at large.  
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After each think tank mention is collected I complete a coding sheet for the 
qualitative material. The coding sheet allows me to categorize the mentions into two groups: 
ideological/polarizing mention or fact-based mention. The determination on which group the 
document is included in is based on the use of ideological/polarizing and fact-based words 
found in Table 3.4. Once a document is chosen using the sampling method described above, 
the public facing communication is searched for the words in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Table of ideological/polarizing and fact-based words searched within think tank mentions 









Special Interest Group Ideology 
 
The list of ideological/polarizing words was decided upon based on existing literature 
on ideological and polarizing language by Members of Congress. In particular, Nicholson 
(2012) studies party identifiers and polarizing cues by politicians through the use of 
informational processing theory of Members of Congress. His research examines partisan 
identity; many of the phrases and language mentioned and derived out his study have been 
used to justify the polarizing and ideological searches within this thesis’s content analysis. 
Study Data  
Statistic Research 





Furthermore, Jensen et al. (2012) study political language since 1873 and “identify highly 
partisan language” (1) in order to conduct an analysis on the pertinence of this language 
through time. Jensen et al.’s study helped provide further justification when developing the 
list of words in Table 3.4. Additionally, in order to directly examine H2A, fact-based language 
is searched in the documents to examine if Members of Congress are citing studies and 
statistics of think tanks. Fact-based language refers to any word that contains verbiage related 
to a study, statistic, or fact that may be mentioned in conjunction with a think tank. Support 
from Groseclose and Milyo's study (2005) in which they tracked the amount of citations by 
think tanks in the news media assisted in my selection of fact-based language to search when 
think tank research is referenced. 
While the words listed in Table 3.4 are not an exhaustive list of terms that would 
identify ideological/polarizing or fact-based language, they provide a systematic approach to 
the content analysis of mentions that contain information relevant to H2A and H2B. Once each 
document is categorized, I conduct a content analysis by using a coding method to identify 
mentions into categories of different frames. In particular, Figure 3.5 demonstrates an 









Table 3.5: Sample completed coding sheet for a legislator’s public facing communication that mentions a think 
tank and has an identifiable word within Table 4.1. 
 
Think Tank and Ideological Category The Heritage Foundation- conservative 
Legislator  Sen. Mazie Hirono (D-HI) 
Date  October 4, 2018 
Ideological/Polarizing or Fact-Based? Ideological/Polarizing 
Floor speech, Tweet, or Facebook Post Floor Speech 
Positive or Negative Rhetoric Negative 
Excerpt Mentioning Think Tank “These last two considerations are 
especially important because the 
Trump administration outsourced the 
vetting of Supreme Court nominees to 
the Federalist Society and the Heritage 
Foundation. These ultra-rightwing groups 
have spent decades supporting people like 




After completing coding sheets for the public facing communications of Members of 
Congress who mention think tanks and the words listed in Table 5.1 in Chapter 5, I then sort 
through the results of each completed coded sheet and sort them into the fact-based or 
ideological/polarizing categories. If an entry contains both ideological/polarizing words and 
fact-based words, I judge which category fits best for a particular entry. For example, if a 
public facing communication mentions a study and includes and ideological/polarizing word, 
it is classified as a Fact-Based document due to the research from the think tank serving as 
the focal point of the content even if it includes ideological/polarizing words. While this 
method makes the process more subjective, I include the excerpt mentioning the think tank in 
each document within the coding sheets that I complete; the coding process is described 
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further below. If a document is chosen that does not have identifiable ideological/polarizing 
or fact-based words, it is be skipped, and the systematic sampling is randomly applied again. 
Then, the ideological/polarizing and fact-based groups are sorted into two 
subcategories: positive rhetoric or negative rhetoric. Positive rhetoric is determined by the 
ideological or polarizing word used in the context of support or affirmation within the frame. 
Negative rhetoric is determined by the ideological or polarizing word used within the context 
of delegitimatizing or negating a think tank or its policy positions. By creating the positive 
and negative rhetorical groups, I quantify the number of positive and negative references 
made by Members of Congress and create visualizations of data on the percentage of 
Republicans and Democrats using this language in relation to liberal and conservative think 
tanks. I also include examples of the text when analyzing the data in Chapter 5 to support the 
data and findings and provide context to the type of rhetoric being used within all the various 
categories. While the coding sheets include the qualitative mentions, they are used for my 
purpose in developing the data and findings, which is why some specific content that stands 
out is directly mentioned within this thesis, but not all of the information collected using the 
coding sheets is. However, the full document containing the 502 coding sheets is available 
upon request. 
 After the steps laid out within this qualitative approach are completed, I evaluate the 
results and data in relation to H2A and H2B. Through data visualizations and numerical 
support of the citations within each classified grouping, I am able to determine the qualitative 
trends in the ways in which Members of Congress engage with think tank information that 
comes from both think tanks that align and do not align ideologically with their designated 
party. The findings found through this method help to support the data collected and 
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analyzed within the quantitative method for H1A and H1B. The accumulation of the research 
through both methodological approaches cohesively responds to the hypotheses at hand and 
attempts to evaluate the research question and theoretical framework of this thesis at large. 
Conclusion  
 
The mixed methods approach of this thesis, including quantitative methods and content 
analysis, considers the dynamic approaches that one can take when researching the existing 
gap in research on how Members of Congress use think tank information in their legislative 
informational organizing and what the implications of this use are. The use of quantitative 
methods serves as a more objective mode of analysis when examining Members of 
Congress’s public facing communications regarding floor speeches, the use of tweets on 
Twitter, and posts on Facebook. Additionally, the content analysis portion of this thesis helps 
provide context to the rhetoric used within the public facing communications of Members of 
Congress mentioning ideological think tanks. Through a combination of these methods, this 
thesis hopes to examine the research question and hypotheses in a multi-dimensional way 
and make conclusions derived out of both of the varied methods. This study is important as it 
helps to fill an integral gap into the ways in which Members of Congress use think tank 
information and the impact that the usage may or may not have on their legislative 
preference. The conclusions of this research can help strengthen the existing think tank 
literature and assist in future research that explores this relationship further. 
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Chapter 4: Quantitative Findings 
 
The public facing communications of Members of Congress are often representative 
of their policy positions and concerns. As a result, in order to evaluate the research question 
of this thesis, it is integral to collect and analyze Members of Congress’s quantitative 
mentions of think tanks in their public facing communications. Through the use of the 
database Quorum Federal, I collect the floor statements, Tweets, and Facebook posts of 
Members of Congress that mention any of the twenty selected think tanks. In response to 
these findings, I analyze the data in considering the hypotheses of  H1A and H1B, which are 
stated below: 
H1A: Think tanks are a prominent and recurring feature of legislators’ public statements and 
presence  
 
H1B: Members of Congress also reference think tank information from think tanks with 
opposing ideology within their public facing communications  
 
Out of the twenty think tanks samples within this thesis, six think tanks are classified 
as centrist, seven are labeled as liberal leaning, and seven are labeled as conservative 
learning. The full list of the think tanks can be referenced in Chapter 3 found in Table 3.2. 
Within the think tank conservative and liberal classifications, it is important to note that each 
institution has a varying degree of ideological composition within the conservative or liberal 
spectrum. Furthermore, in alignment with research of asymmetrical polarization, liberal think 
tanks are not necessarily as ideologically left as some conservative think tanks are right (M. 
A. Smith 2011). Thus, the liberal and conservative think tank categories should not be 
considered ideologically equal in terms of partisan positioning within their respective 
categories. This distinction is necessary when analyzing the data and confronting H1B due to 
the ideological differences between Members of Congress when referencing think tanks with 
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opposing ideology. As a result, the two sets of data from conservative think tank mentions 
and liberal think tank mentions should not be considered equal under these circumstances. 
H1A: Think Tank Mentions as a Prominent and Recurring Feature 
 
In order to confront H1A, I analyze the monthly think tank mentions by Members of Congress 
in their public facing communications. The amount of think tank mentions from January 01, 
2010 to January 27, 2019 can be found next to each respective think tank in Table 4.1. 
Additionally, the monthly average of think tank mentions of within the nine-year period can 
be found in order to provide data on the regularity of mentions over the time frame.  
Table 4.1: Table of total mentions and monthly average of mentions by think tank 
Think Tank Total Mentions Monthly Average 
Heritage Foundation 1100 10.11 
Cato Institute  202 1.85 
ATR 312 2.89 
AEI 250 2.29 
Manhattan Institute 52 0.48 
Hoover Institute 53 0.3 
Hudson Institute 51 0.47 
Center for American Progress 437 4.01 
Brookings Institution 312 2.86 
Human Rights Watch 167 1.53 
Economic Policy Institute 285 2.64 
Center for Economic and Policy Research 34 0.32 
Urban Institute 112 1.04 
Progressive Policy Institute 15 0.16 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 74 0.68 
New America 32 0.32 
RAND 69 0.66 
Atlantic Council  67 0.62 
Bipartisan Policy Center 177 1.74 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  18 0.17 
 3820  
 
 46 
 When analyzing the data in Table 4.1, it is clear that each think tank has been 
mentioned within the time frame more than once. The amount of mentions differs per think 
tank, ranging from 15 mentions of the Progressive Policy Institute and 1100 mentions of the 
Heritage Foundation, which is a 98.6% difference between the two. As a result, while each 
think tank has been a feature of Members of Congress’s public facing communications, they 
have been so at varying levels of prominence and reoccurrence. This finding is important to 
consider when evaluating H1A. In order to compare the data of mentions and average 
mentions per month by think tank, Table 4.2 lists the ten news sources that were first 
proposed in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3.  The table, as Table 4.1 does, lists each news source, the 
total amount of mentions, and monthly average of mentions from January 1, 2010 to January 
27, 2019. 
Table 4.2: Table of total mentions and monthly average of mentions by news company  
News Source Total Mentions Monthly Average  
Fox News 8438 77.41 
Washington Times 1171 10.74 
New York Times 4765 43.72 
PBS 1314 12.06 
CNN 14930 136.97 
ABC Good Morning America 212 1.94 
USA Today 1574 14.4 
National Public Radio (NPR) 2387 21.9 
BBC 372 3.41 
The Economist 4075 37.39 
 39238  
 
 When comparing the data displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, it is apparent that the news 
sources are cited significantly more than think tanks are cited within Members of Congress’s 
public facing communications. The notoriety and nature of news that is disseminated from 
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news companies and sources varies in nature from think tank research, particularly in the 
desire to influence policy, which makes the two groups difficult to holistically compare 
(McGann 2016). Thus, when examining H1A, think tanks are not as prominent and recurring 
within legislator’s public facing communications as news sources. Figure 4.1 visualizes the 
composition of think tank mentions compared to the news source mentions. The bar graph 
demonstrates the significant difference in think tank citations by Members of Congress 
compared to news sources across the nine-year time frame. 
Figure 4.1: Bar Graph of think tank citations compared to news source citations by Members of Congress 
 
 Under the conditions poised within Chapter 3, H1A cannot be wholly accepted in 
comparison to the news sources. However, the average monthly mentions across the twenty 
think tanks in Table 4.1 shows that many think tanks are mentioned monthly across the nine-
year period. For example, The Heritage Foundation is cited on a monthly average of 10.11 
times over the nine-year period and the Center for American Progress is cited an average of 
4.01 times per month. These two think tanks, as the two most cited within the sample group, 
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but notable rates. These findings suggest that while think tank citations within legislators’ 
public communications are not as prominent and recurring compared to news sources, they 
are mentioned at levels depending on the think tank which is important to consider when 
analyzing the role of think tanks within floor speeches and social media. Furthermore, the 
number of citations per month may be impacted by the ideological categorization of the think 
tank, which is important to consider while evaluating the data for HB1. 
H1B: Think Tank Mentions by Members with Opposing Ideology 
 
Beyond examining the regularity of the think tank mentions, I explore the ideological 
makeup of the think tanks and Members of Congress that mention them in their public facing 
communications. Examining the ideological leanings of the think tanks is not only relevant to 
H1B but can provide further context to the trends observed in Table 4.1 when analyzing H1A. 
In Tables 4.3-4.5, the number of think tank mentions by Members of Congress within their 
public facing communications from January 01, 2010 to January 27, 2019 is split by party 
and each think tank is labeled to be either conservative, liberal, or centrist. In Table 4.3, the 
seven conservative think tanks are listed alongside the amount of Republican, Democrat, and 
Independent mentions within their public facing communications. In Table 4.4, the seven 
liberal think tanks and their corresponding statistics can be found in the same format as Table 
4.3. Finally, in Table 4.5, the six centrist think tanks data is displayed. The centrist think 
tanks are not used to directly examine HB1 but they provide an interesting contrast to the 





Table 4.3: Table of conservative think tank mentions by party 
Think Tank Category  Republican Democrat Independent Total 
Heritage Foundation Conservative 830 265 5 1100 
Cato Institute Conservative 114 81 6 201 
ATR Conservative 281 29 0 310 
AEI Conservative 176 74 0 250 
Manhattan Institute Conservative 43 9 0 52 
Hoover Institute Conservative 45 8 0 53 
Hudson Institute Conservative 45 6 0 51 
  1534 472 11 2017 
      
Table 4.4: Table of liberal think tank mentions by party 
Think Tank Category  Republican Democrat Independent Total 
Center for American Progress Liberal 24 403 6 433 
Brookings Institution Liberal 75 168 9 252 
Human Rights Watch Liberal 37 126 3 166 
Economic Policy Institute Liberal 20 253 12 285 
Center for Economic and Policy 
Research Liberal 1 28 5 34 
Urban Institute Liberal 35 75 2 112 
Progressive Policy Institute Liberal 8 5 2 15 
  200 1058 39 1297 
 
Table 4.5: Table of centrist think tank mentions by party 
Think Tank Category  Republican Democrat Independent Total 
Center for Strategic and 
International Studies Centrist 37 35 2 74 
New America Centrist 8 22 2 32 
RAND Corporation  Centrist 26 43 0 69 
Atlantic Council  Centrist 44 21 1 66 
Bipartisan Policy Center Centrist 86 88 3 177 
Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace  Centrist 3 13 1 17 
  2228 2824 98 435 
 
 The data represented in Tables 4.3-4.5 demonstrate that each of the twenty think 
tanks selected for this thesis have been mentioned by both Republican and Democrat 
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Members of Congress since January 01, 2010. Additionally, conservative think tanks are 
mentioned the most among the three groups with 2,017 mentions, liberal think tanks have 
1,297 mentions, and centrist think tanks have 435 mentions. The opposing parties of each 
think tank within the conservative and liberal categories have all mentioned ideological think 
tanks that do not align with their party. However, in order to better analyze the results in 
relation to H1B, Figures 4.2 and 4.1 demonstrate the proportion to which each party mentions 
think tanks with opposing ideology.  
Figure 4.2: Pie chart of Republican, Democratic, and Independent mentions of conservative think tanks 
 
 


















 The data displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 is crucial in responding to H1B. In 
particular, Democrats mention conservative think tanks 57.6% more than Republicans 
mention liberal think tanks, however, it is important to remember that conservative think 
tanks are mentioned 35.7% more at large than liberal think tanks when examining that figure. 
Within these figures, mentions of conservative think tanks by Democrats make up almost a 
quarter of all of the conservative think tank mentions within Members of Congress’s public 
facing communications. In contrast, Republicans cite liberal think tanks 15% of the time, 
which represents that both Republican and Democrat Members of Congress are citing think 
tanks with opposing ideology within their public facing communications, despite there being 
small discrepancies in the rate of mentions between the two parties. 
 In order to examine the individual think tanks within their conservative and liberal 
classifications, the data displayed in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 visualize the amount of mentions per 
think tank by Republicans and Democrats. The data in these figures is made up from the data 
displayed in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 but provides a visual understanding of each think tank and 











Figure 4.4: Bar graph displaying the individual data for conservative think tank mentions by party  
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The data visualized in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 put in perspective which think tanks are 
being cited more often and by which party. In particular, the Heritage Foundation is clearly 
cited more than any other think tank with Republican and Democrat mentions combined. In 
fact, the Heritage Foundation is cited 60.64% more than the highest mentions of a liberal 
think tank, The Center for American Progress. Additionally, The Heritage Foundation and 
The Center for American Progress have been deemed the most conservative and liberal think 
tanks respectively within their groupings by numerous scholars (Katz 2009; McGann 2016; 
M. A. Smith 2011). Within the sixteen ideologically partisan think tanks studied, the two 
most partisan think tanks are the two most cited by Members of Congress within their public 
facing communications. This finding could be reflective of research on asymmetrical 
polarization because the two most partisan or polarizing think tanks are also the two most 
cited institution amongst the sample studied. 
When examining the data in relation to H1B, it is clear that Members of Congress 
reference think tank information from think tanks with opposing ideology within their public 
facing communications. While Democrats mention conservative think tanks 7% more than 
Republicans mention liberal think tanks, both parties have a significant amount of mentions 
across the sample population of think tanks. Thus, H1B is accepted as legislators clearly 
reference think tank information from think tanks with opposing ideology. However, the 
numerical number of mentions within the timeframe does little to shed light on the ways in 
which Members of Congress engage with think tanks depending on their ideology. 
Conclusion 
 
 While both H1A and H1B have been considered separately thus far within this chapter, 
there are important implications and conclusions to make when considering the data and 
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hypotheses all together. The data in Table 4.1, which displays the total amount of mentions 
and monthly average of think tank information by legislators over the past nine years, 
provides a holistic overview of the regularity to which think tanks are cited. However, when 
the data in Table 4.1 is analyzed in conjunction with the data in Tables 4.3-4.5, I was able to 
draw trends and conclusions from the think tanks by ideological categorization and party 
mention when considering H1A. 
 In particular, centrist think tanks, as a group, are mentioned much less than liberal or 
conservative think tanks. This finding is consistent with think tank and polarization literature 
which argues that as Congress becomes more polarized and partisan, the demand for 
advocacy think tanks increases to fill a need for ideologically driven information (Bertelli 
and Wenger 2009). Additionally, the two most cited think tanks by monthly average, The 
Heritage Foundation and the Center for American Progress, in Table 4.1, are also arguably 
the most partisan of the twenty advocacy think tanks. The same conclusion can be found 
when examining the data by party mentions; The Heritage Foundation is cited more than any 
other conservative think tank by both Democrats and Republicans and the same is true for the 
Center for American Progress in the liberal think tank group. As a result, these findings 
demonstrate that the number of mentions by legislators of think tanks in their public facing 
communications varies based on think tank and degree of partisanship of each think tank. It 
appears that the more ideologically right or left think tanks appear more frequently in 
Members of Congress’s communications than more moderate or centrist think tanks such as 
the RAND Corporation or Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
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Chapter 5: Content Analysis 
 
Based on the quantitative findings in Chapter 4, it is clear that legislators are regularly 
citing think tanks and also mentioning think tanks with opposite ideology. As a result, in 
order to analyze think tank mentions by Members of Congress in their public facing 
communications, I decided to apply a content analysis method to provide context to the 
results in Chapter 4 confront H2A and H2B. After establishing that think tanks are a prominent 
and recurring mention of legislator’s public facing communications and that Members of 
Congress also reference think tanks with different ideological leanings than their party 
position, the actual content of these mentions must be examined. In order to unpack these 
findings, I examine the rhetoric within the documents to develop a better understanding of 
the ways in which legislators interact with think tank research in their communications, and 
thus, evaluate the hypotheses below: 
H2A: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that ideologically align with their party to support their policy positions through citations of 
studies or statistics. 
 
H2B: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that do not ideologically align with their party to either support their policy position more by 
mentioning that even think tanks on the other end of the aisle agree with certain policy 
positions or to discredit the credibility of the think tank.  
 
Evaluating H2A allows me to examine how Members of Congress discuss think tanks 
with ideology that aligns with their party while H2B allows me to examine the mentions by 
legislators of think tanks with opposing ideology from their party. The fourteen think tanks 
that are deemed either liberal or conservative in Chapter 3 in Table 3.2 are included within 
the analysis of this chapter. Through sampling the full population of think tank content from 
January 01, 2010-January 27, 2019, I collected 502 think tank documents and completed 
coding sheets for each one identifying important information. The information found in each 
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coding sheet includes the think tank being mentioned, the Member of Congress mentioning 
the think tank, the date, mode of public communication, the category it falls within 
(ideological/polarizing or fact-based), and the type of rhetoric displayed (positive or 
negative). The use of coding sheets allows me to input the qualitative findings into Excel and 
calibrate both quantitative and qualitative results that enable me to collect evidence in 
response to H2A and H2B. 
Before examining the results found within this chapter, it is important to distinguish 
possible shortcomings with the data. In particular, the sample population of conservative 
think tanks compared to liberal think tanks is asymmetrical; more conservative think tanks 
are sampled and there is more data within this frame. As a result, when analyzing the results, 
it must be noted that more documents for conservative think tank mentions have been 
examined due to the proportional differences between the amount of think tank mentions 
from each ideological side. Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 4, it is essential to 
recognize that despite seven think tanks being classified as either conservative or liberal, 
there is variation within each grouping as to the extent of how conservative or liberal each 
think tank is. Thus, there is likely to be variation within the ways that legislator’s mention 
think tanks within their public facing communications.  
H2A: Legislator’s Mentioning Think Tanks That Ideologically Align with Their Party 
 
In order to evaluate H2A, I grouped the 502 mentions into two categories: 
ideological/polarizing and fact-based. I grouped documents that reference think tank research 
through citations, statistics, and studies within the fact-based category. Of the 502 mentions, 
255 of them were categorized as fact-based and positive. The proportion of fact-based 
mentions per party think tank ideology is displayed in Figure 5.1. Of all of the fact-based 
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mentions, none of them displayed negative rhetoric, thus, the data found in Figure 5.1 has all 
been subcategorized as positive rhetoric.  




 The results displayed in Figure 5.1 demonstrate that fact-based mentions of think tank 
research by Members of Congress is more prevalent when the think tank aligns with the party 
of the legislator. In particular, there are 124 fact-based mentions by Democrats with liberal 
think tanks and 85 fact-based mentions by Republicans with conservative think tanks. In 
juxtaposition, there are only ten fact-based mentions by Democrats with conservative think 
tanks and 36 fact-based mentions by Republicans with liberal think tanks. There are 
significant differences between the amount of fact-based mentions depending on think tank 
ideology and party, whereas there are 91.9% more fact-based mentions by Democrats of 
liberal think tanks compared to mentions of conservative think tanks. In regard to Republican 
fact-based mentions, there are 58% more fact-based mentions by Republicans with 
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sampled population of this thesis, there are a significant amount of fact-based mentions by 
Members of Congress with think tanks that align ideologically with their party. 
 In order to qualitatively explore these results further, examples of fact-based mentions 
of each category need to be explored. In order to do this, I analyze content from completed 
coding sheets that have been categorized as fact-based within each party and think tank 
ideology combination. When analyzing these coding sheets, I noted two major trends. First, 
when Members of Congress mention think tanks with corresponding ideology to their party, 
they typically cite statistics, studies, or research from the think tank to support a policy 
position put forth by the Member of Congress. Second, when a Member of Congress cites 
fact-based research from a think tank with opposing ideology, they sometimes emphasize 
that the think tank typically opposes certain policy positions to stress that a particular piece 
of research came from a think tank with ideology on the other side of the aisle. Additionally, 
legislators citing fact-based research from an opposite think tank typically use the citation to 
support a common policy position within their own party. When Members of Congress 
employ this method, they attempt to add additional credibility to their policy position 
providing research from a think tank that surprisingly aligns with their argument. 
Nonetheless, out of all of the fact-based mentions, all of them include citations or research 
that supports sentiments reflected by the legislator.  
For example, in regard to the first trend, Former Representative Lou Barletta (R-PA-
11) cited a study by the Heritage Foundation in a Facebook post on June 28, 2013 concerning 
the argument for granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants in the United States saying: 
If signed into law, this bill will greatly increase the number of newly-legalized 
workers in this country, who would then compete for scarce resources and jobs 
with legal immigrants and the 22 million Americans who woke up this morning 
unable to find a job. Granting amnesty to millions of illegal immigrants would 
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be a fiscal drain on the federal budget, the economy and legal American 
residents. It will suppress wages, and cost taxpayers about $6.3 trillion in social 
benefits over the life spans of the new residents – even after-tax receipts are 
realized – according to a study by the Heritage Foundation. 
 
Former Representative Barletta, in this document citing the Heritage Foundation, uses the 
study by the think tank to support his policy position on illegal immigration. Through the use 
of statistics and policy claims, Congressman Barletta affirms the fact-based research from the 
Heritage Foundation and applies it to support his existing ideological positions on the issue 
which also reflects the Republican party platform on immigration (Hawley 2011; Martin 
2017). As a result, this example supports H2A and provides context to an example of a fact-
based mention of a conservative think tank by a Republican Member of Congress.  
 Another example of a Republican fact-based mention of a conservative think tank 
within their public facing communications is a Tweet by Representative John Carter (R-TX-
31) on August 21, 2013 mentioning a study by the Cato Institute. In his Tweet, 
Representative Carter states, “A new study by the CATO Institute shows that welfare 
programs pay more than minimum wage in 38 states. Why work... http://t.co/RSq5rNxGzs.” 
Representative Carter references a study by Cato Institute concerning states that pay more for 
welfare than minimum wage and then adds “Why work…” to his Tweet. The content within 
his tweet implies that the amount that welfare referenced in the Cato study disincentivizes 
people to work and instead enables them to depend solely on welfare. The study supports 
Representative Carter’s policy position echoed on his congressional website stating 
sentiments such as: 
I’ve long [Representative Carter] supported funding bills that save taxpayer 
dollars by prioritizing funding and trimming back or eliminating areas of waste 
and inefficiency.  These efforts rein in executive overreach and bureaucratic red 
tape that infringes on the rights of Americans and stifles economic growth 
(Congressman John Carter : Federal Spending 2019) 
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In his policy positions mentioned on his congressional platform, the Cato Institute study 
compliments his existing policy beliefs which also frequently align with Republican ideals as 
well (Gupta 2010). This example supports H2A because of the way that Congressman Carter 
cites a study by Cato Institute to support a policy position/sentiment. 
 In regard to the second trend observed with the fact-based data collected, 
Representative Ted Budd (R-NC-13) mentioned research from the Center for American 
Progress in a floor speech on November 01, 2017 saying: 
The Center for American Progress, which has not traditionally been friendly to 
relaxing financial regulations, has said that these reforms, which were made 
available to smaller companies in the JOBS Act, were some of the most 
successful provisions in that law. This bill applies them to all companies, not 
just those with a certain amount of revenue. 
 
The rhetoric used by Congressman Budd in this floor speech is positive, however, he 
specifically mentions that the think tank “has not traditionally been friendly to relaxing 
financial regulations”; financial regulations are typically associated with liberal or 
Democratic ideals. As a result, his reference to research conducted by the Center for 
American Progress is used to emphasize that even a think tank that typically opposes policy 
positions of decreased regulation has “said that these reforms, which were made available to 
smaller companies in the JOBS Act [a policy that Congressman Budd supported (Brady 
2017)], were some of the most successful provisions in that law”. This excerpt from his floor 
speech reflects the second trend found in the fact-based mentions when Members of 
Congress mention research from think tanks with opposing ideology. Additionally, 
Congressman Budd was able to emphasize that the Center for American Progress is not 
typically fond of decreased financial regulations without using ideological/polarizing 
language, which differs from results are discussed in the second half of this chapter. 
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 I also observed the same trends within Democratic mentions of think tanks in 
Members of Congress’s public facing communication. In regard to the first trend, Democrats 
mention liberal think tanks in their public facing communications in a fact-based manner 124 
times out of the sampled timeframe and population. Within these citations, Democrats 
reference studies or statistics to support their policy positions. For example, on September 
22, 2017, Senator Mazie Hirono (D-HI) cited a Center for American Progress study in a 
Facebook post regarding how Hawaii residents would be impacted if the Affordable Care Act 
(H.R. 3590) was repealed. In her post she states: 
A New York Times analysis showed Hawaii would be the 11th-hardest hit state 
in terms of funding cuts per person. By 2027, according to an analysis done by 
the Center for American Progress, 95,000 Hawaii residents would either lose or 
have significantly reduced health insurance coverage. And health care 
consulting firm Avalere estimates that from 2020 to 2036, Hawaii would lose 
about $30 billion in federal funding — a 43 percent decrease. 
 
At the time that H.R. 3590 was passed, Senator Hirono was a Representative in the 
House and voted in favor of the Affordable Care Act (Rangel 2010). As a result, the 
Senator clearly had existing policy preferences in regard to the policy. Thus, as 
reflected in her Facebook Post, she cites statistics from the Center for American 
Progress to demonstrate how Hawaiians would be negatively impacted if the 
Affordable Care Act would be repealed. This example demonstrates the first trend 
observed in the fact-based mentions collected within the sample of this thesis and 
therefore, supports H2A. 
 In further support of the first trend observed and of H2A, another example of a 
public facing communication by a Democrat mentioning a liberal think tank with fact-
based information can be analyzed. In particular, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), 
is infamously known as a rigorous supporter of climate change initiatives in Congress 
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through his voting record and self-reported ideology (Acting on Climate Change and 
Protecting Our Environment | U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island 2019). 
Senator Whitehouse cited a Brookings Institute study in a floor speech concerning 
climate change issues on December 19, 2012 stating that: 
A Brookings Institution report found the clean economy employs 2.7 million 
workers. That is manufacturing and exports, the kind of jobs that support a 
strong middle class. But in Congress we are sleepwalking through history. We 
are sleepwalking through history, and we must wake up; awaken to our duties, 
awaken to our responsibilities, awaken to the plain facts that lay all around us 
if only we would open our eyes and see them 
 
Senator Whitehouse’s citation that a clean economy employs 2.7 million workers not 
only supports his continued policy preferences to support and implement climate 
change policy but that there are also economic benefits that ensue when a clean 
economy is promoted. This example highlights how Members of Congress incorporate 
the use of think tank statistics within their public facing communications that backs 
their policy preferences. This finding supports the hypothesis found in H2A. 
In relation to the second trend, Former Representative Louise Slaughter (D-NY-25) 
cited a Cato Institute study in a Facebook Post on January 28, 2017 discussing President 
Trump’s executive order (13769) on closing borders to refugees from particular countries in 
the world, including Iran, Somalia, Sudan, and more (Executive Order Protecting the Nation 
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States 2017). This executive order was 
adamantly opposed by Democrats, including Congresswoman Slaughter. Her Facebook Post 
states: 
The president's executive order late last night closing our borders to all refugees 
and citizens from several countries around the globe is outrageous and an 
affront to America's values. My heart breaks this afternoon reading news reports 
of refugees with valid visas already in flight to our country being turned away 
once they land at our airports, putting them in legal limbo. One person detained 
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even worked on behalf of our nation in Iraq for a decade. According to a report 
from the Cato Institute, from 1975 to 2015, not a single American was killed 
on our soil by a citizen of a country included in the president's executive order. 
This move is not based on the facts and is not sound foreign policy. It is simply 
cruel. 
 
The content within this post directly reflects Congresswoman Slaughter’s policy 
position that the executive order “is outrageous and an affront to America’s values.” 
The citation of a Cato Institute study reaffirmed her position through the research that 
“not a single American was killed on our soil by a citizen of a county included in the 
president’s executive order.” The reference of this study in her public facing 
communication reiterates that refugees from the countries listed within President 
Trump’s executive order are nonviolent, thus, suggesting that the justification of the 
executive order is flawed. This example reflects the second trend observed within the 
fact-based research results as Representative Slaughter used the research from the Cato 
Institute to provide factual information that supported her policy position. 
 When considering the data in Figure 5.1 in conjunction with the six examples and 
analyses of fact-based think tank mentions by Members of Congress, I accept H2A due to the 
ample amount of both quantitative and qualitative support found within the sample of the 502 
documents searched through within this thesis. 
H2B: Legislator’s Mentioning Think Tanks That Do Not Ideologically Align with Their Party 
 
The data used for fact-based mentions by strongly supports accepting H2A can also be 
referenced in addressing H2B when analyzing how Members of Congress mention think tanks 
that do not ideologically align with their party. Out of the 502 public facing communications 
sampled, 247 were sorted into the ideological/polarizing category. Unlike the fact-based 
mentions, the ideological/polarizing mentions of think tanks by Members of Congress 
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contain documents with both positive and negative rhetoric. As a result, Figures 5.2 and 5.3 
visualize the data for positive and negative ideological/polarizing mentions, respectively.   
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 Within the ideological/polarizing documents, there are hardly any negative mentions 
for any combination of party and think tank ideology other than Democrats mentioning 
conservative think tanks; there are 83 ideological/polarizing by Democrats mentioning 
conservative think tanks. In regard to positive ideological/polarizing mentions, the most 
significant portion of these mentions are from Republicans citing conservative think tanks 
and Democrats with conservative think tanks. As mentioned earlier, since conservative think 
tanks make more of the sample than liberal think tanks, it is important to note that the 
distribution of mentions per think tank ideology is not equal in the evaluation of the data. 
Despite these differences, the quantitative data displayed in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 must be 
examined further through analyzing the supplemental qualitative content of select documents 
that fall within these categories in order to accept or not accept H2B. 
 An example of a Democrat mentioning a conservative think tank in a positive 
ideological/polarizing can be found in a floor speech given by Representative Sandy Levin 
(D-MI-9) on July 17, 2013. In her speech, Congressman Levin discussed components of the 
Affordable Care Act that he supported and mentioned the Heritage Foundation to add even 
more support. In particular, Congressman Levin stated that: 
Republicans know this. Why? Because the individual mandate was 
a Republican idea going all the way back to the 1980s, when the conservative 
Heritage Foundation originated the idea. Its supporters have argued: All 
citizens should be required to obtain a basic level of health insurance. Not 
having health insurance imposes a risk of delaying medical care. It also may 
impose costs on others because we, as a society, provide care to the uninsured. 
The risk of shifting cost to others has led many States to mandate that all drivers 
have liability insurance. The same logic applies to health insurance. 
 
In his floor speech, Representative Levin mentions that the individual mandate was actually 
an idea developed by the Heritage foundation. Through specifically mentioning that the 
Heritage Foundation is conservative, she emphasizes that the individual mandate is not just a 
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Democratic or liberal policy. Additionally, after the Congressman mentions that this idea 
originated from the Heritage Foundation, he lists the benefits of the individual mandate to 
reaffirm his support. This mention of the Heritage Foundation exemplifies the hypothesis 
stated in H2B because of how Representative Levin positively engages with the think tank but 
does so in a way that undermines conservative policy positions by demonstrating that a 
conservative think tank was behind a policy that Republicans now adamantly oppose, thus, 
providing more credibility to her argument and policy position at large (Rangel 2010). 
 The same theme observed in Congressman Levin’s speech can also be found in a 
floor speech given by Senator Richard Burr (R-NC) mentioning the Center for American 
Progress in a positive ideological/polarizing way. On July 14, 2015, Senator Burr mentioned 
the think tank in a speech regarding an amendment he co-sponsored to the Every Child 
Achieves Act (ECAA) which passed with a vote of 59 to 39 (Bennet-Burr Amendment to 
Better Fund Education for Impoverished Children Passes Senate 2015). When discussing the 
amendment Senator Burr stated that: 
Eliminating this provision has been suggested by organizations like the Center 
for American Progress, the Formula Fairness Campaign, the Rural School and 
Community Trust, and others. These are not conservative groups. These are 
very left-of-center groups who said equity is important 
 
Senator Burr mentions the Center for American Progress as a supporter that has suggested 
the same content within the amendment propose. However, he designates that “these are not 
conservative groups. These are very left-of-center groups,” thus, he tries to appeal to both 
Republicans and Democrats by demonstrating that his policy position has been supported by 
liberal groups. Senator Burr tries to appeal to Democrats to be supporters of the amendment 
by using positive ideological/polarizing language. This finding and example aligns with the 
hypothesis in H2B. 
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A final example of a document collected that was sorted into the positive 
ideological/polarizing group is a floor speech given by Senator Patrick “Pat” Leahy (D-VT) 
on October 03, 2017. In his speech, Senator Leahy discusses his unwavering support for 
admitting refugees into the United States. In particular, he mentions a funding bill that he 
supports which funds offices and programs that reflect his policy positions on the issue. In 
his speech he states that: 
Last month, the Senate Appropriations Committee--on which I serve as vice 
chairman--unanimously approved a funding bill that demonstrates our 
unwavering commitment to refugees. It fully funds offices that are critical to 
the continuity of refugee programs and even provides a $50 million increase to 
the State Department's refugee assistance and resettlement missions. Our 
bipartisan bill repudiates any claims by President Trump that the United States 
is unwilling to commit the resources required to fund a refugee program that 
honors our history as a refuge for the persecuted. Even the conservative 
Heritage Foundation has called on President Trump to set annual refugee 
admissions "based on historical refugee levels," which have never dropped 
below 67,000 per year since the beginning of the Reagan administration. 
 
In Senator Leahy’s justification for the funding bill that provided further funds for refugee 
assistance and resettlement he mentions that President Trump is along in his unwillingness to 
support refugees. He supports this claim by mentioning that “even the conservative Heritage 
Foundation has called on President Trump to set annual refugee admissions ‘based on 
historical refugee levels.’” Senator Leahy uses this statistic to emphasize that even a 
conservative think tank has positions on the issue that are at odds with the sentiments 
expressed by Republican President Trump. Additionally, he mentions the support by the 
Heritage Foundation to also add credibility to his argument that the bill not only reflects his 
policy positions, but even conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation have echoed 
similar preferences. As a result, this example also supports H2B. 
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 After noting the positive ideological/polarizing examples, it is important to also 
analyze negative documents within the same category. Within this category, Democrats 
clearly negatively engage with conservative think tanks more than any other group. A 
reoccurring Senator who mentions conservative think tanks in this way is Senator Sheldon 
Whitehouse (D-RI). Senator Whitehouse, as mentioned early, is well-known for his advocacy 
efforts in addressing climate change. As a result, he has given numerous floor speeches 
discussing conservative think tanks that oppose climate change by arguing that these think 
tanks are working in corporate interests and hurting the country and world as a result. For 
example, in a floor speech given by Senator Whitehouse on May 06, 2015, he mentions 
several conservative think tanks, including the Hoover Institution, the Heritage Foundation, 
and the Cato Institute, saying that: 
This is the climate denial beast. Polluter money and dark money are its lifeblood. 
PR front groups are its organs, and lies and obfuscation are its work. Look at 
the complex interconnection of the beast's major players. The green diamonds 
are the big funders--the Koch affiliated foundations, the Scaife-affiliated 
Foundations, the American Petroleum Institute. The blue circles are the who's 
who of tea party, libertarian, and front groups who have wittingly or not become 
the flacks for the fossil fuel industry--the Heartland Institute, the Hoover 
Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the Mercatus Center, 
to name just a few. Think how much trouble someone must have gone to set all 
this in play. Think how important the purpose would have to be to them to take 
all that trouble. 
 
Senator Whitehouse’s rhetoric is clearly negative when mentioning these conservative think 
tanks and the role that he argues they play in climate change denying. This example provides 
insight into how many Democrats mention conservative think tanks negatively in an 
ideological/polarizing way. Senator Whitehouse tries to discredit the think tank and provide 
reasoning behind why these think tanks deny climate change in their research, which 
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supports H2B. Additionally, the core of the issue is centered around Senator Whitehouse’s 
policy preferences, which guides the content of his floor speech and issue framing at large. 
 In contrast to Senator Whitehouse’s negative public facing communication, it is 
important to also see how Republicans have engaged with liberal think tanks in a negative 
ideological/polarizing way.  For instance, Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX-2) 
mentioned the Center for American Progress in a floor speech on July 11, 2017. In his speech 
he stated that: 
Now, there is this liberal group, apparently, Center for American Progress, 
liberal think tank--I don't know what their tank is full of, but it is obviously 
more socialistic thinking. But according to this liberal group, the Center of 
American Progress, if 23 million fewer people have health insurance, then the 
coverage losses from the Senate bill would result in 27,700 additional deaths 
in 2026 and 217,000 over the decade. Well, isn't that interesting. There is 
nothing that they can adequately point to as a factual basis.  
 
This particular example was difficult to categorize because it has both fact-based and 
ideological/polarizing language within the speech. However, due to the fact that the 
ideological/polarizing rhetoric is dominant within the citation of statistics, I decided to 
categorize it as such. When analyzing the excerpt within the speech, it becomes clear that 
Congressman Gohmert introduces the think tank as a liberal think tank and dismisses their 
credibility even before citing their study by saying “I don’t know what their tank is full of, 
but it is obviously more socialist thinking.” Then, after citing the statistics from the Center 
for American Progress, he states that “there is nothing that they [the Center for American 
Progress] can adequately point to as a factual basis,” which is Representative Gohmert’s 
attempt to discredit the think tank and the research stated in order to support his policy 
position against the Affordable Care Act. In alignment with the results in Senator 
Whitehouse’s negative speech, Congressman Gohmert similarly mentions the think tank 
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ideologically opposite to his party to add credibility to his position and hinder the beliefs of 
the other side. 
 Another common finding within the sampled documents that were categorized as 
negative ideological/polarizing was during the hearings of Supreme Court Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh. Numerous Democrats provided floor speeches discussing the nomination in a 
negative way. The list of potential nominees that was provided to President Trump was 
jointly decided on and recommended by the Federalist Society and the Heritage Foundation. 
While there are many examples of rhetoric for this particular topic, a floor speech given by 
Senator Richard “Dick” Blumenthal (D-CT) on July 17, 2018 exemplifies the themes well by 
stating  
They have an ideological agenda and no respect for quality in deciding who will 
serve on the judiciary. Those groups that are trying to remake the court of 
appeals and the Federal district courts--that is, to remake judges at the lower 
level--whether it is the Federalist Society or the Heritage Foundation, are also 
responsible for the President's decision to make himself a puppet of their 
recommendations, letting them pick judges who meet their anti-choice and anti-
healthcare litmus tests.” 
 
Senator Blumenthal, in his floor speech, mentions the Heritage Foundation as a group that 
has “an ideological agenda and no respect for quality in deciding who will serve on the 
judiciary.” By using this language, he seeks to discredit the think tank in the process of 
nominating a Supreme Court Justice. Additionally, he makes these claims in support of not 
supporting the nominee choices due to the ideological process that he explains. This example 
demonstrates how Members of Congress engage with ideologically opposite think tanks in 
the effort to discredit them and provide more legitimacy to the argument made by the 
legislator themselves. This public facing communication, along with the other examples 
analyzed, supports H2B. 
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 After considering the six qualitative examples analyzed within this section of the 
chapter as well as the quantitative data found in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, which show that a 
significant portion of the sampled population has ideological/polarizing mentions, H2B can be 
accepted. As a result, I accept both H2A and H2B based on the amount of evidence that 
supports the hypothesis within the sampled population.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Previous research regarding the role of think tanks and their connection with 
Members of Congress has left critical gaps in literature. In particular, existing literature has 
not fully examined how think tank research is used by Members of Congress in their public 
facing communications and the impact that these findings may have in policy-making at 
large. Instead, most think tank literature focuses on the measuring the influence that think 
tank research has on policy-making by looking at the product of policy rather than the 
processes leading up to its development. However, studying think tank influence on policy-
making assumes that Members of Congress gather think tank research to influence their 
policy preferences which leads them to use this information in the making of policy. 
However, this argues that Members of Congress’s policy preference shapes the research they 
use and cite from think tanks and their policy-making choices are developed from their 
policy preferences but not influenced by the think tank information they use. In considering 
this alternative theoretical framework and the research gaps that exist, this thesis sought to 
answer the question: How and to what extent is think tank research used in Members of 
Congress’s public facing communications? In order to analyze this question, I employed a 
mixed methods approach with quantitative analysis and content analysis to deconstruct the 
ways in which Members of Congress cite think tank research in their public facing 
communications. Through this approach, I tested four hypotheses: 
H1A: Think tanks are a prominent and recurring feature of legislators’ public statements and 
presence.  
 
 When testing H1A, I collected and examined data that supports think tanks as a 
prominent and recurring feature of legislators’ public statements and presence. By analyzing 
the amount of total mentions for the twenty think tanks selected for this thesis, as well as 
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computing the monthly average of think tank citations per think tank, I was able to analyze 
the regularity of think tank citations in Members of Congress’s public facing 
communications. In doing this, I found that there were 3,820 citations of think tanks by 
Members of Congress during the nine-year time frame studied. However, each think tank has 
their own unique amount of citations. Think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and Center 
for American Progress have more citations and a higher monthly average of citations 
whereas other think tanks like New America and the Center for Economic and Policy 
Research have less. These differences are important to consider due to no think tank being 
the same as another and each making up a different proportion of the total number of 
citations for all of the twenty think tanks.  
When comparing the data for think tank citations to news sources citations, news 
sources are clearly cited much more frequently than think tanks. As a result, I found that 
think tanks are a prominent and recurring feature of Members of Congress’s public facing 
communications but are not as frequently cited as news sources such as Fox News and CNN 
are. However, it should be noted that there are fundamental differences between the 
research/information from think tanks and news sources including the availability of the 
content, the nature of the content, and the audience intended for each category (Groseclose 
and Milyo 2005). Thus, while the comparability measure applied for H1A in this thesis helps 
provide a comparison of prominence, the differences between think tanks and news sources 
makes the method imperfect. As a result, there is sufficient evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that think tanks are a prominent and recurring feature of Members of Congress’s 
public facing communications, however, not to the degree that news sources are prominent.  
H1B: Members of Congress also reference think tank information from think tanks with 
opposing ideology within their public facing communications.  
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This hypothesis received significant support based off the evidence of the proportion 
of mentions by Republicans and Democrats when mentioning conservative and liberal think 
tanks. In particular, within the parameters of the nine-year period and three modes of public 
facing communications studied, Democrats mention conservative think tanks 23% of the time 
while Republican’s mention liberal think tanks 15% of the time. These findings support this 
hypothesis by demonstrating that Members of Congress are clearly engaging with and citing 
think tanks with opposite ideology within their public facing communications. However, the 
8% more citations by Democrats with conservative think tanks compared to Republicans 
citing liberal think tanks is a difference worth noting. Similar to the data analyzed when 
evaluating H1A, there is variation of how often each individual think tank is cited by each 
party. This variation is likely due to differences in notability, research, and funding for each 
think tank which shapes the conditions in which Members of Congress would cite the think 
tank within their public facing communications (McGann 2016). A major question that arises 
after finding evidence that supports this hypothesis is what are Members of Congress saying 
when citing think tanks with opposite ideology. After finding evidence that demonstrates that 
legislators are citing these think tanks, it is important to deconstruct what is being said when 
considering the research question and theoretical argument of this thesis. This question is 
confronted in the testing of H2A and H2B. 
H2A: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that ideologically align with their party to support their policy positions through citations of 
studies or statistics. 
 
Both H2A and H2B concern the actual content of the public facing communications by 
Members of Congress citing think tanks.  Through employing a content analysis and 
sampling method, I quantitatively categorized the types of citations by legislators and 
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collected and analyzed the data as to the types of citations and rhetoric used within the 
mentions. The evidence found through this method supports this hypothesis when analyzing 
what Members of Congress mention when citing think tanks that align with their party. This 
finding is significant in understanding how legislators interact with this research in relation to 
their policy preferences; the evidence suggests that legislators use think tank research in their 
public facing communications to support policies that they are already known to align with. 
By using a systematic coding method to categorize types of citations, I was able to directly 
analyze the fact-based mentions of citations with statistics and studies to support H2A. 
Through the collection and examination of the evidence for H2A, I found that the results 
reflect the alternative theoretical model proposed in this thesis.  
H2B: Members of Congress mention think tanks within their public facing communications 
that do not ideologically align with their party to either support their policy position more by 
mentioning that even think tanks on the other end of the aisle agree with certain policy 
positions or to discredit the credibility of the think tank.  
 
After analyzing legislators’ citations of think tanks that ideologically align with their 
party, the evidence used to examine H2B helps support the research gaps that exist after 
analyzing H1B. In particular, while it is quantitatively clear that Members of Congress are 
citing think tanks with opposite ideology than their party, the research question and 
theoretical framework cannot be adequately addressed without understanding the content and 
rhetoric within these citations. In analyzing the mentions by Members of Congress of 
ideological think tanks that do not align, it becomes clear that legislators cite these think 
tanks in one or two ways. In particular, they either cite research from these think tanks to 
further support an existing policy position of theirs. This method allows legislators to 
confront opposition from the other side to demonstrate that research from a think tank with 
opposite ideology even supports their positions. Secondly, Members of Congress also 
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mention these think tanks to discredit the credibility of the think tank on certain policy 
positions. These two findings strongly support H2B and provide context as to what legislators 
are saying when citing think tanks with opposite ideology. 
 The research and results of this thesis provide evidence that supports the alternative 
theoretical model that argues legislators are primarily not using think tank research to shape 
their policy preferences, rather, their policy preferences are already in place and instead 
shape the research they use from think tanks. However, these findings are not entirely 
conclusive and cannot be used to completely accept the alternative theoretical model and 
hypotheses at large. In particular, the use of interview content with Members of Congress 
could help directly provide insight into the perspectives of legislators and their citations of 
think tanks within their public facing communications. Originally, this thesis poised this 
method but due to the 2018-2019 government shutdown, I encountered significant logistical 
issues in conducting the interviews. As a result, further research could explore this method to 
provide additional evidence to the alternative theoretical framework and research question. 
While interview content would also present limitations, including the authenticity of answers 
given by Members of Congress and their staff, this method could advance the research and 
findings found in this thesis, particularly in regard to the alternative theoretical model. 
 Further research more examination into the role that think tanks have in Members of 
Congress’s public facing communications. While I found quantitative data that supports think 
tank citations as a prominent and recurring feature of their public facing communications, 
more research can be done regarding the extent of this hypothesis. As referenced earlier, 
interview content would help frame how important legislators view think tank research in 
their public facing communications. Additionally, additional quantitative data could be 
 77 
collected with other comparison methods to think tank citations other than news sources to 
study think tank citations as a prominent and recurring feature of legislators’ public facing 
communications. Furthermore, direct analysis of each mode of communication, including 
Facebook Posts, Tweets, and Floor Speeches, can be separately analyzed to gather evidence 
in the different citation approaches for each mode. By doing this, research can provide 
additional insight into the logistical ways that Members of Congress use these methods to 
cite think tank information. This thesis helps to confront the gap in literature on the use of 
these communications by Members of Congress when citing think tanks but does not 
eliminate that gap entirely.  
A limitation that exits within the research of this thesis is the subjective nature of the 
content analysis and coding method. In particular, the coding method employed to quantify 
the documents into categories contained evaluation that was not entirely objective and 
contained human error. Thus, this limitation could potentially impact the results found using 
these methods and could be used and refined in different ways if further research utilizes 
similar methodologies. Further research could test different coding methods in order to 
combat this limitation. 
Keeping these findings and limitations in mind, there are several important 
conclusions to be drawn from the research conducted within this thesis. Firstly, the evidence 
found in examining all four hypotheses supports the alternative model in regard to Members 
of Congress’s policy preferences shaping their choice of think tanks citations in their public 
facing communications. These findings have important implications in the way that research 
is understood in shaping, or not shaping, legislators’ policy preferences. Additionally, further 
research using the alternative model can be done with other types of research or advocacy 
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institutions including interest groups or news sources. This framework can help facilitate 
future research. As more information and evidence arises on this topic, literature on the role 
of research in the making of policy can be expanded. 
Another important takeaway from this thesis is how platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook are changing the ways that legislators create their public facing communications. 
This new way that Members of Congress are sharing and disseminating information has 
significant implications on the structing of research in the future. As think tanks continually 
seek to satisfy the “desperate daily need for intellectual meat to feed the hearings, the 
speeches, [and] the unrelenting policy grinder” (Medvetz 2012: 6), one can foresee this 
process being impacted, as advanced and changing platforms arise. As Lerner (2018) recently 
proposed, social media can be further examined to better understand the ways that these 
platforms are shaping how Members of Congress interact and use research and the role this 
may have on the making of policy at large. Studying the impact of think tank research must 
move beyond the process of policy-making and also explore the interactions that occur 
before the making of policy, which this thesis attempted to do through studying think tank 
citations within Members of Congress’s public facing communications. While this thesis 
took a step in analyzing these methods of communication, further research can be done as the 
time-frame in which these platforms are being used continues to increase and more data can 
be examined.  
Future research on public opinion can also examine how the use of think tank 
research by Members of Congress impacts public support or opinion. This thesis provided 
evidence that think tanks are being mentioned prominently and reoccurring. As a result, 
further research can examine whether or not Members of Congress citing these think tanks is 
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impacting public opinion and the role that ideological citations have in this relationship. This 
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